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THE ADJUDICATION OF UTILITARIANISM AND RIGHTS IN THE SPHERE
OF HEALTH CARE
Moore, Harry L., Ph.D. The University of Oklahoma, 1998, 204pp. 
Chair: Edward Sankowski
This dissertation serves as a monograph on the moral and 
social implications of a utilitarian-based system of health 
care which recognizes and takes rights seriously. Though the 
design and claims are stated primarily in terms of utilitar­
ianism, admittedly, there are elements of communitarian, 
deontological, and rights theories which have been 
incorporated.
Such a commingling of theoretical elements, under the 
claim of being utilitarian, may seem ambiguous, however, it is 
my contention that such inclusions only serve to enhance the 
plausible nature of this sphere-specific form of utilitar­
ianism and the adjudication of rights. Additionally, though 
there are other components of theories included, the basis of 
utilitarianism still serves as the foundation by which all 
other actions, decisions, and values are judged.
While it is true that utilitarianism offers a standard 
for all areas of life, the idea of examining a sphere or 
environment of utility, in this case, the utility associated 
with the sphere of health care, allows for the good to be 
clearly defined. One primary weakness of classical utili­
tarianism is that it ignores, or at least does not do full
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justice to, the notion of personal responsibility or sense of 
obligation. If the only duty or requirement is to produce 
some obscure sense of the "greatest good" or the "greatest 
happiness," the question of how the good is identified and who 
is to have the good remains unanswered by the traditional 
utilitarian construct.
The classical view of utilitarianism is too broad in its 
scope of defining "the greatest good" or realm of value. But 
to narrow the area of value to a particular sphere or 
environment allows for the utility and associated rights in 
question to be identified, the value measured, and the success 
more easily interpreted.
While maintaining the general premise of utilitarianism, 
that is, "the greatest good for the greatest number," the 
notion is not from some nebulous concept or subjective 
position about life or feelings in general. This sphere- 
specific position also acknowledges and defines the "rights" 
of the individual within the particular sphere being 
considered, in this case, the sphere of health care.
IX
Chapter 1 
Introduction
The whirlwind advancement of health care over the past 
fifty years may best be epitomized in a written statement from 
Wilbur Wright. Referring to the multiplicity of events he 
experienced while flying the first airplane, he writes, "With 
the machine's moving forward, the air flying backward, the 
propellers turning sideways and nothing standing still, it 
seemed almost impossible to find a starting point from which 
to trace various simultaneous reactions.
Medical knowledge, procedures, pharmaceuticals, and 
technology continue to advance, driving up costs at 
astronomical rates. Expectations and demands by health care 
consumers continue to escalate, and the administration of the 
system seems out of control.
In addition, there is minimal agreement among the key 
players (e.g., hospital administrators, politicians, and 
insurance companies) on how to correct or control the health 
care system. The technologic explosion in medicine makes it 
almost impossible to find a point of reference from which to 
explore the problems and potential resolutions, if any, of 
such a system in a constant state of change and confusion.
This quote comes from the Wilbur Wright exhibit at the Aero­
space Museum, San Diego, California.
Additionally, many health care policies, proposed 
economic solutions and various types of health care reform 
have been laid on the altar, built by the health care 
industry, and offered up in smoke in an attempt to appease 
this behemoth god of medicine. Philosophical arguments and 
intricate theories have attempted to design plans which would 
minimize or eradicate the associated ethical problems of 
justice, rights, and equality for the recipients of health 
care.
For example, one theorist has proposed that the problem 
lies in a pluralistic society's attempt to address 
biomedical/ethical issues from too many fragments of varying 
moral perspectives. He contends that the solution may be 
found only by identifying a common ground or point of 
reference based on what he calls a "content-full morality,
H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., The Foundations of Bioethics, 
Second Edition, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 1- 
17. Engelhardt argues that there must be a common ground of 
ethics from which moral and medical decisions are made. The 
identified arena for such kindred spirits and common ground 
source is found only from the Judeo-Christian tradition. 
While it is true that the Judeo-Christian tradition may 
provide a common source of identification for an ethical and 
moral position, it can be argued that even among this group 
there is frequent disagreement regarding major ethical issues. 
Theologians, ethicists, physicians, scientists, and other 
contributors to the field of medical ethics, who align 
themselves as like-minded and coming from the Judeo-Christian 
tradition, fail to agree on what constitutes a moral/ethical 
foundation for addressing such ethical issues as euthanasia, 
abortion, terminating life support, and artificial tube 
feedings.
which is grounded in the Judeo-Christian moral tradition.
More specifically, Engelhardt views the Roman Catholic 
version of the Judeo-Christian tradition as the ideal 
framework within which to make moral, medical, bioethical 
judgements and decisions. Coming from a Roman Catholic 
tradition, Englehardt has reduced his theoretical position, 
concerning bioethics, to one theological in nature. While his 
claim for a "content-full morality" is commendable, to add a 
theological position does not offer "the" common ground for a 
moral position; it only offers "a" common ground which is 
further limited by one's conservative or liberal position.
Another theorist, John Rawls, has advocated a theory 
which, while theoretically and philosophically appealing, 
could hardly begin to support or adjudicate the issues of 
equality, rights, and/or justice associated with the real 
scenarios found in life, in general, and more specifically, 
the medical/ethical issues in health care. And to impose a 
"veil of ignorance, whereby everyone is in the same blind 
position, fails to acknowledge the individuality of each 
person. Such an idealistic scheme denies a sense of personal 
history and the unique psychological makeup of the individual, 
which even in theory seems meaningless.
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Massachusetts: The Belknap
Press of Harvard University, 1971), 136-37.
Admittedly, there are a multitude of theoretical 
positions regarding health care and related ethical issues. 
This dissertation, however, serves as a monograph on the moral 
and social implications of a utilitarian-based system of 
health care which recognizes and takes rights seriously.
Though the viewpoint is utilitarian, it is different from 
other forms of utilitarianism in that it is focuses on a 
particular sphere.< That is, it focuses strictly on the 
sphere of health care and the adjudication of rights within 
this sphere.s it is acknowledged up front that no single 
theory can provide a solution or even a universally acceptable 
position. But, perhaps, the continuous reformulation of a 
particular theory can provide an additional grain of 
intellectual and pragmatically relevant ethical truth.
Though the design and claims of this dissertation are 
stated primarily in terms of utilitarianism, admittedly, there
The idea for the term "sphere-specific" comes partly from 
the title and content of Michael Walzer's book. Spheres of 
Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality, (United States: 
Basic Books, A Division of Harper Collins Publishers, 1983), 
and partly from the notion that life is lived within spheres 
of experience.
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While the focus is on health care, the idea behind the 
notion of sphere-specific utilitarianism is that any number of 
other life or "human" spheres may be plugged into the 
calculus. With modifications to meet the specific needs in a 
particular sphere, the theoretical dynamics of this sphere- 
specific utilitarianism should be met.
are elements of communitarian, deontological, and rights 
theories which have been incorporated. While the inclusion of 
these theoretical components may provide an impure form of a 
utilitarian theory, it is acknowledged that there are and will 
be decisions and standards of conduct independent of, or 
seemingly in conflict with, classical utilitarianism, or any 
other theory for that matter. And while the major premises 
are utilitarian, it is my hope to retain some features of 
these theoretical constructs and reconcile them with a more 
communitarian outlook.
Such a commingling of theoretical elements, under the 
claim of being utilitarian, may seem ambiguous. However, it 
is my contention that such inclusions only serve to enhance 
the plausibility of this sphere-specific form of utilitar­
ianism and the adjudication of rights. Additionally, while 
there are other components of theories included, the basis of 
utilitarianism still serves as the foundation by which all 
other actions, decisions, and values are judged.
Accordingly, while it may be acknowledged that 
individuals have rights beyond "life and liberty," such rights 
do not follow from some ideal conception of societal justice 
or humanity, but from a shared conception of social goods.® 
For "the idea of distributive justice has as much to do with
6
Walzer, xv.
being and doing as with having, as much to do with production 
as with consumption . . .[and the] multiplicity of goods is 
matched by a multiplicity of distributive procedures, agents 
and criteria.
The sacrifice of a community or nation's infrastructure 
and well-being in the distribution of created goods, for the 
sake and sanctity of the notion of autonomy and the 
individual's perceived right to this or that, in this case 
health care, is a no-win situation.® Justice in the distri­
butive process calls for some social controls and "defined 
limits of freedom"® within the particular sphere of goods or 
services being distributed. The intersection of autonomy and 
interdependence, individual rights and mutual obligation, 
calls for a "natural sensibility which impels us to see 
ourselves in relationships of interdependence with other 
people and take responsibility both for our own lives and for 
what happens to others as well."^°
"All goods with which distributive justice is concerned
Ibid., 3.
e
Willard Gaylin and Bruce Jennings, The Perversion of 
Autonomy: The Proper Uses of Coercion and Constraints in a 
Liberal Society (New York: The Free Press, 1996), 6.
9
Ibid., 7.
10
Ibid., 4.
are social goods.. . .[which] have shared meanings, because 
[the] conception and creation [of these goods] are [defined 
by] social processes."^ It is from these social processes 
that social goods and personal qualities have their own 
spheres of operation, in which they work their effects 
"freely, spontaneously, and legitimately."^^
It is from this notion that Spheres of Justice, by 
Michael Walzer, has been a major influence. I agree with his 
notion of a "distributive logic" which claims that " [health] 
care should be proportionate to illness and not to wealth.
I do, however, disagree with his view that "no single 
principle of distributive justice can govern all social goods 
and their distribution."^ The principles of utilitarianism 
can serve as the benchmark by which all distributive actions, 
values, and consequences are judged.
However, even with the supposition that the traditional 
view of utilitarianism offers a standard for all areas of
11
Walzer, 7.
12
Ibid., 19. It is from this statement that the notion of 
spheres of utility came to fruition.
13
Ibid., 86.
14
Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of 
Biomedical Ethics, Fourth Edition (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1994), 338. (See Walzer's discussion in Spheres, pp. 
3-10).
life, it fails to take into account the specific rights and 
responsibilities connected with the area of life being 
evaluated. The idea of examining a sphere or environment of 
utility, in this case, the utility associated with the sphere 
of health care, allows for the good to be more easily defined 
and translated into success.
One primary weakness of classical utilitarianism is that 
it ignores, or at least does not do full justice to, the 
notion of personal responsibility or sense of obligation. If 
the only duty or requirement is to produce some obscure sense 
of the "greatest good" or the "greatest happiness," the 
question of how the good is identified and who is to have the 
good remains unanswered by the traditional utilitarian 
construct.Even with the assumption that the "greatest good" 
applies to any and all areas of life, the good or value 
intended must still be defined.
Another problem with the classical view of utilitarianism 
is that it is too broad in its scope of defining "the greatest 
good" or realm of value. But, to narrow the area of value to 
a particular sphere or environment allows for the utility and 
associated rights in question to be identified, the value 
measured, and the success more easily interpreted. Again, it
15
Ross, W.D., "What Makes Right Acts Right?," Ethical Theory: 
Classical and Contemporary Readings, Louis P. Pojman, ed., 
(California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1989), 256.
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is here that Walzer's notion of social goods having their own 
spheres of operation^® comes into play, when identified with 
the rights contained within the particular sphere or 
environment of utility being evaluated.
It is my contention, therefore, that the "greatest good," 
in association with specific rights, must necessarily be 
defined or examined from within a particular sphere or 
environment, which serves as the focal point in which the 
theory is grounded. While maintaining the general premise of 
utilitarianism, that is, "the greatest good for the greatest 
number, " the notion is not from some nebulous concept or 
subjective position about life or feelings in general. This 
sphere-specific position also acknowledges and defines the 
"rights" of the individual within the particular sphere being 
considered, in this case, the sphere of health care.
To put it another way, what kind of algorithm can be 
applied in order to know if the results or the desires to 
achieve "the greatest good" is successful? For example, the 
value of any medical activity is to restore some semblance of 
health; it is not the thing (i.e., the medicine, test, 
procedure, or surgery) itself which defines the "good" or 
value, but it is the sphere or environment within a particular 
context which gives or defines the value.
16
Ibid., 7.
Another example might be the availability or use of a CT 
scan (Computerized Axial Tomography) machine. The utility or 
value will be determined by the sphere or environment in which 
it is used, that is, it is the identified sphere or context 
which determines the value. Suppose there are three circum­
stances or arenas: one involves a person, the next involves 
the legal system, and the last involves a business. How will 
the value or utility be determined?
For the individual brought into the emergency room, after 
being injured in a motor vehicle accident, the CT scan may be 
of benefit in determining internal injuries not visible by 
routine x-rays. In this case, while the CT scan is important, 
it is not the machine which has value, but the results it 
produces. These results allow for the identification of 
certain sustained injuries, which provides the physician with 
the means to better know what treatment is needed, which, in 
turn, will help the person to regain a state of health.
From the perspective or sphere of the legal system, the 
use or availability of a CT scan machine has no value, unless 
it happens to be relevant to a particular case involving 
malpractice, which could have been avoided by the results 
produced by the test. However, if such a test was not 
warranted, then it is of no consequence to the value or sphere 
of litigation.
The last arena mentioned, the business environment, will
10
have a totally separate means of determining the utility, 
based on the production of a particular product, good, or 
service, in this case, the production of the CT scan machine. 
If a particular company produces the CT machine, then the 
value, success, or utility to be measured will be the number 
of machines sold, not the number of CT scans, or the reason it 
was or was not used.
While there are some goods that are needed absolutely, 
such as medical care, "there is no good such that once we see 
it, we know how it stands vis-a-vis all other goods and how 
much we owe to one another. The nature of the need is not 
self-evident."^ But, such need is somewhat determinable by 
virtue of the identified or particular sphere of utility, with 
its different conceptions, associated rights and experiences. 
This, in turn, leads to "different patterns of provision"^® and 
notions of distributive justice related to that specific 
sphere of goods or services needed or in demand.
"Despite the inherent forcefulness of the word, needs are 
elusive. People don't just have needs, they have ideas about 
their n e e d s t h e y  have degrees and various priorities
n
Ibid., 65.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid., 66.
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associated with their perception of need. These degrees and 
priorities are related not only to the concept of human nature 
but also to the history and culture of a particular society.
"Since resources are always scarce, hard choices have to 
be made.. . and while such choices are subject to
philosophical elucidation, the idea of a need or a communal 
commitment to meet such a need does not yield any clear 
calculation of degrees or priorities. Clearly, every need 
cannot be met to the same degree, "or any need to the ultimate 
degree,"-^ but, by examining needs and the goods or services 
associated with those needs, in relation to the specific 
sphere in which the needs exist, perhaps a more precise form 
of distributive justice may be attained.
Utilitarianism and a Right to Health Care
One particular advantage of utilitarianism over other 
theories is that the principle of utility is the ultimate and 
guiding principle by which all other principles, morals, 
ethical positions, and virtuous actions are measured. In 
defining this utilitarian system of health care and in an
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid., 66-67.
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attempt to address some primary issues associated with health 
care, the major focus will be to adjudicate the internally 
coherent ethical theory of utilitarianism with the issue of 
rights. That is, to achieve the greatest good for the 
greatest number of health care recipients while recognizing 
and supporting one's right to accept or reject the health care 
offered by this system.
The ethical implications of such a system, which 
acknowledges, defines, and supports the individual's right(s), 
will by necessity include the individual's responsibility in 
connection with the entitlement or right. Pragmatically, the 
reasons for a utilitarian designed system of health care are 
as follows. First, since utilitarianism is closely linked to 
economics, the rational and efficient use of resources is by 
necessity a primary component.
Second, since the function of morality is to serve as a 
guide to ethical human conduct, and utilitarianism is a 
consequence-based ethical theory, the value or utility of the 
actions associated with health care are to achieve the 
greatest benefit for the largest number, with the resources 
available. This, of course, does not mean that there are no 
negative or less than desirable outcomes, but the utility, 
intent, or "greatest good" or "benefit over burden" of the 
sphere of health care is maximized, decision-making or prima
13
facie obligations^^ becomes clearer, and the resolution of 
conflict is strengthened. Such action calls for a reduction 
in the continued use of scarce medical resources for cases 
which are deemed futile, based on clinical evidence of 
prognosis and ability to respond to treatment.
Third, as argued by David Hume, the obligation to benefit 
others comes from the principle of reciprocity. That is, if 
there are benefits received from society, then by virtue of 
this principle, society can expect and the individual has an 
obligation in return to promote or contribute to that 
society's well-being or best interest.
Fourth, associated with the intent of medicine is the 
principle of beneficence, that is, to do good with the health 
care resources available. Fifth, patient participation in 
his/her care has become a recognized right associated with the 
principle of autonomy, allowing greater involvement to accept 
or decline further treatment and use of health care resources.
While there are many topics associated with this 
participation in whether to allow or decline a treatment or 
procedure, the focus will be restricted. The primary 
discussion, associated with patient autonomy, will address the 
ethical question a right to health care and whether an indi-
23
W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford; Clarendon 
Press, 1930), 19-36.
14
vidual can morally demand medical treatment even if such 
actions are deemed futile by the physician and the patient has 
failed to respond to care already received.
Economics and Ethics
Health care expenditures rose from nine percent of the 
Gross Domestic Product in 1980 to more than fourteen percent 
in 1992, with an expected increase to more than nineteen 
percent by the year 2000.^ Regardless of one's philosophical 
framework or theoretical position, economics is a vital part 
of the equation in health care.
Currently, there are more than two million Americans who 
lose their health care coverage each month; some will get it 
back, but the numbers continue to add to the more than 37 
million who already go without health care coverage.Many 
who have health insurance will lose their benefits due to 
unemployment, some because of their inability to continue 
making payments for medical insurance, and still others 
because benefits have been cut by their employer due to rising 
costs. Out of this 37 million, there are more than nine 
million children who are not covered under any form of a
24
Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, "Health 
Security: The President's Report to the American People,"
1993.
Ibid., 2.
15
health care plan.^®
In addition, procedural costs and technological 
capabilities have seemingly outstripped the affordability of 
health care for many individuals within the U.S. The system 
has also advanced to such complexity that the ethics of humane 
and reasonable treatment seems to have been lost to defensive 
medicine, triggered by a litigious society. Just because the 
potential exists for prolonging the physiological character­
istics of a person, do such possibilities and acts of vitalism 
always constitute the preserving of "life," thereby negating 
the responsible and realistic use of medical resources? I 
think not.
While many may choose to ignore the economic 
considerations of receiving and providing health care, it is 
by necessity a relevant factor which must be given equitable 
consideration. The issues of one person's so-called "right" 
to health care, that is, to receive the resources and 
equitable treatment must be evaluated in terms of benefit and 
burden.
Ethical concerns and health care reform have been, and 
continue to be, major political and economic "hot topics" of 
discussion. Attempts have been made to ensure that every 
citizen can access the system and receive medical treatment.
Ibid.
16
regardless of the prognosis or ability to pay. The down side 
is that many individuals have come to view this as a guarantee 
of a "right" to health care, when in reality, health care in 
the current market is a commodity to be purchased and is not 
and never has been a "right" in the United States.
Only in the event of an emergency or evidence of some 
type of guaranteed financial reimbursement has medical care 
been considered a "right." The up side, and only clearly 
defined "right," which is recognized and supported legally and 
clinically, is the right of the individual to have input into 
his or her treatment. This right also includes the 
individual's right to decide whether or not to even receive 
treatment, and the right to declare, in advance, what he or 
she would want if in a terminal or persistently unconscious 
condition.^
In spite of the shift to respect patient autonomy, 
provide quality health care, and effectively utilize the 
technological advances by which to cure illnesses and prolong 
life, we are still burdened with a system that is seemingly 
inequitable, unjust, and does not serve the greatest number or 
achieve the greatest good. The reality is that health care
27
These rights have been acknowledged and made a part of the 
legal system by the Patient Self-Determination Act of 1991, 
and are expressed in the Advance Directive, as related to the 
withholding or withdrawal of medical treatment if diagnosed as 
being terminally ill or persistently unconscious.
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has costs and the current system does not guarantee a "right" 
to health care.
Additional problems are created by the unrealistic 
expectations by "consumers" which lead to the false assumption 
that health care is a right. This is due, in part, to earlier 
decades when health care costs were lower, and health 
insurance coverage paid for most, if not all, medical 
expenses. The fact remains, that the delivery of health care 
in the U.S. is, and always has been, based on a market-driven, 
fee-for-service system. It is only within the past ten to 
fifteen years that consumers have begun to realize the actual 
costs involved in medical care received, resulting in an 
increase of uncompensated care costs and "bad debts" by 
consumers
None of the current plans and policies being considered 
for health care reform propose a feasible plan of economic and 
equitable revision. While a change in the health care system 
is essential, to identify some of the key issues may help to
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better understand how and what kind of theoretical and 
applicable reform will be necessary.
Policies and Politics
A critical discussion of issues may make it possible to 
design a workable system, rather than the usual tactic of 
designing a system and then examining the issues. However, as 
the myriad of experts discuss the various policies of 
recommended change, they "seem not only to be talking about 
different matters but even speaking different l a n g u a g e s . " Z ?
Not only do the experts fail to agree on the central 
points of what is being discussed, but also they disagree on 
who will be identified as the target group (s), e.g., the
elderly, children, or unemployed that must be considered and 
will most likely be affected by the revisions. In their 
failure to agree upon or identify the recipients, they miss 
the means and methods of designing a reasonably just and 
equitable system of health care distribution. As a result, 
the various players instrumental in the design and development 
of policies for a health care system talk at rather than to 
one another without establishing an agreeable agenda for 
reform.
29
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In October of 1993, President Clinton's "Report to the 
American People" called for reform of the health care system 
with universal access and health care security to be provided 
for all citizens. His statements brought to light the well- 
known reality that the American health care system is itself 
critically ill. It lacks competent administration, coherent 
organization, and ethical vision, and has become "intolerably 
expensive," shamefully inefficient, and definitely unjust.^®
A progression of theories, policies, and procedures have 
attempted, and failed, to meet the needs of this leviathan 
system. The rationale of medicine is to promote the health 
and welfare of the patient and to help ensure the general 
health of society, but somewhere along the way, this goal has 
been lost. In the evolution of the health care system, an 
illusion has emerged that medical care is a "right" rather 
than a commodity within the United States.
Such persistent demands for treatment, whether effi­
cacious or not, reflect the prevalent idea that as long as 
someone will pay, there is an entitlement or "right" to health 
care. This misperception includes the notion of having a 
"right" to have "everything done," regardless of the ethical 
considerations, futility of treatment, or cost. In part, this
26
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is due to the fact that as late as 1987 close to three- 
quarters of individual "health care expenses were paid by a 
private or public third party program/ with minimal to no 
out-of-pocket expense being borne by the consumer. However, 
by 1994, uncompensated care costs had risen to an estimated 
$21 billion,28 due to individuals losing or being unable to 
afford health care insurance.
With a major focus on the idea or principle of patient 
autonomy, many individuals have seemingly become confused 
about the genuine meaning of autonomy. The assumption seems 
to be that autonomy serves as a guarantor of any and all 
demands placed upon the resources of medicine; for example, a 
family demands that everything medically possible be done to 
sustain the patient's "life," even when such measures are 
deemed futile by the physician.2®
On the positive side, the emphasis on autonomy and 
patient self-determination has evolved to serve as a 
corrective measure to physician and family paternalism.
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allowing the patient to refuse unwanted or futile treatment. 
Another consideration is that while the sick individual is a 
patient with rights to accept or reject treatment(s), he/she 
is also a citizen with responsibilities associated to that 
right. That is, the acknowledged right to make health care 
decisions should not be seen as an absolute or guaranteed 
right outside a given context. This context is bounded by the 
reality of the patient's ability to respond to the care 
received, the reality of limited resources and a society which 
recognizes the competing rights of others.
Part of the problem is perpetuated by technology and the 
availability of potential life-prolonging procedures (e.g., 
heart, liver, and kidney transplants), which lend themselves 
to the often unrealistic expectations, by the patient and/or 
family, from medicine. Another major concern is found in the 
system itself; attempts are to keep everyone happy while 
trying to fix the system with Band-Aids.
Policies have been designed which attempt to achieve 
valued outcomes through programs which are supposedly 
sensitive to the context of time, place, and perceived need, 
but fail to address or adapt to the constant changes in health
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care demands. The tendency is to create policy after policy, 
resulting in a system so complex and unclear that values and 
perceived needs are perpetually in conflict.
Surely such attempts cannot be viewed as legitimate means 
of providing an equitable system of health care. To continue 
to provide medical care where minimal success is the expected 
outcome, while allowing others to be subjected to receiving 
substandard care or go without basic care is unequitable, 
unjust, and unethical.
In the development of these various schemes of policy 
design there has been an establishing, then mixing and 
mingling of "Welfare Economics," "Public Choice," "Social 
Structure," "Information Processing," and "Political Philos­
ophy. The attempt to achieve some semblance of order,
equity and justice has resulted in a mishmash of policies, 
procedures and political disputes with no viable ethical and 
equitable resolution in sight.
Much of what happens might be analogous to building a 
house with multiple floor plans, numerous builders, and 
various types of nonuniform materials. The end product may be 
called a house, it may somewhat resemble a house, but it is 
functionally compromised. These policy designs will be 
examined in more detail in Chapter 2.
32
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utility. Rights, and Health Care: Toward a More Equitable 
System
The purpose of ray dissertation will be to examine the 
health care system within the United States and propose a 
utilitarian^^ system of health care. While a redesign of the 
health care system is needed, it will only be generally 
alluded to in order to address more specific issues related to 
health care.
In particular, the issue of what constitutes the good in 
health care, defining a "right" to health care, adjudicating 
the theory of utilitarianism with the issue and rights, and 
the idea of the patient's responsibility in the context of 
utility and rights, will be critically examined and discussed.
The primary intent, therefore, is to develop a 
theoretical and practical model which will address and 
adjudicate a theory of "rights" within a sphere-specific 
utilitarian system of health care. Some of the key concerns 
relevant to a more equitable system of health care
33
From this point on the term "utilitarian" will be used to 
equate with the idea of "the greatest good for the greatest 
number." That is, the whole concept of this writing is that 
health care is a "good", something to be received like a 
commodity, and this commodity should serve to perpetuate the 
"good", namely, beneficence, which is measured by the "good" 
or primary principle of utility. The right to this good is 
guaranteed by genuine need, with the associated responsibility 
of not abusing the system and helping to maximize the use of 
scarce resources, especially towards the end of life.
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distribution will also be explored.
The general assumption is that "utilitarianism cannot 
support or yield a system of rights with moral f o r c e . S u c h  
a supposition presupposes a "conflict of interest" and a 
"conflict of welfare" among the recipients because of the 
potential for perceived injustices and inequalities in 
benefits afforded to individuals by the system.
In the various interpretations of utilitarianism, it 
seems those "states of mind" and "perceptions of happiness or 
pleasure" have predominated, rather than proposing the idea 
that "[T]he moral impulse of utilitarianism is to define the 
right as good consequences and to motivate people to achieve 
[them]. The utilitarian dictates for right action, in the 
sphere of health care, are based on the principle of 
beneficence and the need of the patient. Whether the person 
has a "right" or entitlement to this service is the question 
at hand.
It is my contention that the issue of "rights" must be 
defined in conjunction with the idea of a particular system 
and an established or clearly defined set of rights rather 
than merely from the individual's perspective and the claim
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for an assumed right. One important element which is 
seemingly overlooked in most theories addressing the issue of 
rights is the participant's responsibility; the tendency is to 
discuss rights without mention of the recipient's obligation 
in relation to that particular, identified right.
Given the complexities of the concepts of equality and 
rights, the idea of distributive justice should be pursued 
only within a particular sphere. The nature and limits of a 
sphere being determined by the general and specific needs or 
purpose of the identified sphere (for example, the sphere of 
health care, education, community, and workplace). The sphere 
of health care, for example, has the general criteria of 
monitoring and providing the means to ensure community health 
and safety through public health clinics which provide 
inoculations for various types of diseases. More specif­
ically, the particular goal of medicine is to provide health 
care for the individual.
Another example is found in the sphere of education. In 
most countries public education for children is considered a 
need which is provided through the efforts of communities 
establishing schools. In the United States, the need of 
public education for children, in general, is met through such 
community efforts. More specifically, private schools have 
been established to meet other identified needs or demands for 
a different quality or level of education.
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Naturally, the development of policies which address the 
sphere specific needs will not work strictly within the micro 
realm of the individual or the macro realm of society at 
large. Clearly defined boundaries and consequences must be 
established within the particular system or policy being 
examined.
Utility in the sphere of health care, as a clearly 
defined system of distribution, could create a genuine right 
to needed care at a more objective and equitable level. The 
idea of "justice" and "fairness" in our current system becomes 
obscured, self-serving, and totally subjective for a 
particular individual or family, especially when there is no 
accountability for demands made and no financial 
responsibility for care received.
In Mill's treatises Utilitarianism and On Liberty, he 
briefly touches on the idea of proper education, in particular 
for the "youth." His notion is that such action would provide 
the means of ensuring each individual's ability to cognitively 
identify, appreciate, and experience the higher pleasures. 
This in turn would ideally enhance the sum happiness of the 
aggregate.
While such hedonistic idealism may be theoretically 
proposed, there is no practical outcome to be realized, and 
obviously with Mill's minute mention of such education, he too
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might have sensed it to be an exercise in futility. Part of 
the problem in attempting to educate the masses is that such 
idealism does not affect people where they live, and pleasure 
or happiness is a very subjective experience.
Another identifiable problem is that while utilitarianism 
is concerned with maximizing consequences and achieving the 
greatest good for the greatest number in general, my theory is 
more narrowly defined and sphere specific. That is, the 
intent is to maximize the good or greatest benefit over burden 
in the distribution and utilization of health care resources 
for the greatest number.
Most theories addressing principles of utility seem to 
put the cart before the horse, that is, they want to define 
the individual within the system, rather than defining the 
system and educating the individual about reasonable 
expectations, responsibilities and acknowledged rights within 
that particular sphere or system. The "greatest good" must 
necessarily be defined from within a particular arena, not 
from a position about life in general; there must be a point 
of reference from which the theory can be grounded in order to 
work.
Being an ethical/moral theory based on utilitarianism, 
the parallel-grounding principles for this sphere-specific 
form of utility, and from which all other axioms are deduced 
or measured, are beneficence, nonmaleficence, autonomy and
28
justice.^® In other words, the utility or the good to be 
achieved in the sphere of health care is supported and ideally 
realized by these secondary principles.
Any system of health care, in particular, a liberal sys­
tem of health care, does not mean carte blanche for each and 
every individual. Such a system recognizes the individual as 
autonomous with certain previously defined rights and 
responsibilities, as a member of that society. Not only is 
the person responsible for what he does, but also, for what he 
does not do.
Utility of health care recognizes the physical and mental 
well-being of each citizen, with the greatest "good" being the 
right of every citizen in the U.S. to receive needed basic 
health care^ in order to maintain some semblance of quality 
of life. Such a system also acknowledges that certain 
individuals will be or are limited in realizing "good health" 
by virtue of congenital defects, life style choices (again the 
issue of responsibility) and injury related physical 
limitations. This liberal, utilitarian-based health care
36
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While the terms "reasonable" and "basic" may seem very 
subjective, the ideal in this context is that everyone 
individual is guaranteed the right to health care and 
treatment that is efficacious in eliminating the condition and 
will help restore the individual to a reasonable or realis­
tically achievable state of health.
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system recognizes the right of the individual to live how he 
or she might choose to live, with the understanding that there 
will be no discrimination or refusal of reasonable care should 
medical treatment be needed.
For example, the person who contracts the AIDS virus 
would receive whatever treatment is needed, but must also 
realize that in the end stages of the disease only comfort 
care would be available. The cancer patient who has had 
numerous treatments of chemotherapy and radiation therapy, 
with no evidence of remission, would be kept comfortable and 
as free of pain as possible.
Further futile treatment would no longer be an option, 
regardless of patients wishes or the coercion of a 
paternalistic, egocentric doctor who takes the patient's death 
as a personal affront to his skills as a physician. Neither 
would the family or a family member be able to serve as the 
interloper of the patient's fate, refusing to accept the 
realities of the situation. This system would also do away 
with "free" clinics which provide substandard care.
In such cases where an individual is born with no hope of 
survival, or a person becomes terminal because of a certain 
type of disease (e.g., cancer, AIDS, and renal failure) or 
physical injury or condition (e.g., stroke, anoxic brain 
injury, and head trauma) treatment is often futile and only 
serves to prolong the dying process, giving a pseudo
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appearance of life which is sustained only by machinery, 
tubes, and medications.
Reasonable and efficacious medical treatment should be 
used when there is hope for the individual to recover to some 
form of sentient and reasonable quality of life. But, the 
reality is that such recovery is not always possible. In 
these cases, the resources could be used for another person's 
potential recovery.
One identifiable problem is, of course, who will decide 
what constitutes the idea of "right," "good," "quality," 
"futility of treatment," or "who lives and who dies?" Another 
major concern is how the system will be established to ensure 
some semblance of justice and equality, without becoming 
bogged down in bureaucratic red tape associated with the 
various governmental forms, policies, and procedures.
There is also a problem associated with the phrase "right 
to health care." This cliche encompasses a cluster of moral 
concerns often used to solicit support of some social program; 
but it is also a phrase which contains no clear sense of a 
moral foundation or content.^ If health care, or access to 
the health care system, is a "right," regardless of ability to 
pay for services rendered, then can it be considered a more
38
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legitimate right than the need for the basic necessities of 
life such as food, clothing, and shelter? Clearly, health 
care is a need, but the question of whether it is a right must 
be more clearly defined.
It is my proposal that health care can be considered a 
"right" only in a utilitarian-designed system of health care; 
of course, this will call for a clearer understanding of what 
the system entails and what is entitled to in such a system. 
These issues will be addressed and more thoroughly defined in 
succeeding chapters.
In chapter 2 there will be an overview of the health care 
industry during the 20th century within the United States, 
exploring some of the contributing factors which have helped 
to create such a problematic and unjust system. In 
particular, this chapter will address some of the social and 
political problems associated with various policies found 
within the current system. While this chapter may not seem 
immediately relevant to the sphere specific utilitarian theory 
development in later chapters, its purpose is to provide 
insight into the ethical concerns and inequities which exist.
Chapter 3 will present the idea of equality and 
responsibility of access to the proposed system of health care 
reform. Cries of "equality" are heard throughout the nation, 
but there is little talk of responsibility connected with 
those demands. A liberal system of health care is not a free
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ride, but neither should it provide a multi-tiered system of 
health care which meets the needs of some and ignores the 
needs of others.
Chapter 4 will attempt to define some of the basic 
characteristics of a more equitable system of health care 
reform and delivery from the general premises of a utili­
tarian system, that is, "the greatest good for the greatest 
number." This will necessarily include defining what is meant 
by the word "good," and how it is to be incorporated into a 
utilitarian theory of health care. The basic premise is that 
the "good" or common good in health care is a societal 
experience, based on some notion of equitable access to basic, 
quality health care.
Another element of design in this theory of the common 
good is the idea of both positive and negative responsibility 
on the part of the individual and the collective whole. That 
is, we are not only responsible for our actions, but we are 
also responsible for our decisions not to act. The concept of 
utility does not negate concern for the individual, his 
desires, wishes, or acts of self-fulfillment, but it does call 
for a recognition of certain responsibilities and consider­
ations to the general welfare of others within the community.
Addressing the issue of rights will be the theme in 
Chapter 5. More specifically, the issue of "rights" within 
the context of health care will be examined. It seems the
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term "right" has become mistakenly associated with the idea of 
receiving any and all medical care. An analysis of the 
meaning of the word "right" must be given and the term 
examined and clearly defined in order to determine what kind 
of right is offered and supported by the health care system 
and society at large. While most theorists do not hold to the 
idea of utilitarianism being compatible with rights, it will 
be the intent of this chapter to argue for a utilitarian 
health care system which recognizes and honors a person's 
right to medical care.
The intent of Chapter 6 will be to explore the issue of 
medical futility and propose a system of distributive justice 
which serves in conjunction with rights and responsibilities 
in this sphere form of utilitarianism.
Chapter 7 will serve as the conclusion, attempting to put 
the whole theory in perspective. Trying to balance the 
theoretical and practical elements of a theory is never easy, 
but is a necessity when attempting influence and bring change 
to a society.
Adjudicating the theory of utilitarianism and the issue 
of rights in health care does not, and cannot serve as a 
solution to the associated problems in health care, but can 
possibly help overcome some of the limitations of previous
34
"formulations of ethical responsibility."^ While seemingly 
idealistic, I believe that this form of utilitarianism is the 
most plausible theory to provide a more just and equitable 
system of health care, and contributes to the notion that 
rights and utilitarianism can be adjudicated.
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Chapter 2 
A Brief Historical Overview of Health Care Advancement in the 
20th Century: The Social and Political Implications
At the beginning of the 20th century, a large portion of 
the American population consisted of young adults and 
children. Health care was relatively inexpensive, generally 
ineffective, and focused primarily on acute illnesses. As the 
century and technology advanced, more effective health care 
was made available, which necessarily increased the cost of 
care received due to the expenditures for research and 
technological advancement. Still, health care costs, resource 
allocation, and priority-setting were not primary economic 
issues.
By the 1930s, scientific progress and the depression 
created a shift in concern for economic issues due to the 
mounting and unpayable bills by both patients and providers. 
In an attempt to address some of the rising economic concerns, 
talk emerged of developing a national health care system and 
consumer-owned medical cooperatives. In an attempt to reduce 
health care costs as political/economic issues, private 
hospitals and physicians invented state medical societies and 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield, initiating a financial scheme 
which allowed providers to maintain control, calming the 
political waters and discussions of government-controlled
36
health care schemes.
The Forties and Fifties saw a big push to increase access 
to health care resources through programs such as the Hill- 
Burton Act, which promoted an increase in hospitals, clinics, 
long-term facilities, and other sites for the provision of 
health care services. Antibiotics and the advancement of 
medical and surgical skills, learned on the battlefields of 
World War II, began to affect the practice of medicine across 
the country.
New techniques in emergency treatment, trauma care, and 
other valuable interventions learned in the Korean War, 
further contributed to the advancement of medical technology 
and skills in caring for patients. Tax-exempt health care 
benefit plans gained increasing popularity for workers and 
employers, creating the illusion that health care costs were 
and would remain stable, i.e., the consumer did not realize 
the full cost of medical care received.
In the Sixties, attention focused on ways to improve 
access to health care through new government programs to pay 
for care and ways to address shortages in health care services 
by increasing the number of physicians and other health care 
professionals. In 1967, Medicare benefits were initiated for
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services provided in extended health care facilities, after 
the third day of hospital stay. Social Security amendments 
also mandated studies, experiments, and demonstrations of 
alternate systems to control rising health care expenditures. 
As billions were fed into the medical-industrial health care 
machine, inflation continued to escalate.
In response to rising medical costs and in an attempt to 
introduce cost-control and rationing. President Nixon 
implemented a policy which would encourage competitive- 
corporate-medicine. From this plan, subsidies were made 
available to create health maintenance organizations (HMOs); 
all businesses who provided health care benefits were required 
to offer this plan as an option to their insured workers.“
Successes of public and private programs began to cause 
a different set of concerns to surface in the 1970's. 
Incentives placed before the health care field by public and 
private purchasers of health care resulted in increases in the 
number of health professionals, services, resources, and 
technological advances. Funding programs to expand the number 
of sites for health care services and attempts to remove 
financial barriers to improve and create universal access 
resulted in increased utilization and expenditures.
The proliferation and duplication of services and
41
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equipment/ the progression in quality of care, the necessity 
of services, and an increase in defensive medicine practices 
and tort reform caused the health care system to become ripe 
for utility studies. As a result of these deliberations, 
action plans were developed to meet the growing costs and 
demands for health care.
The Eighties witnessed the convergence of technological 
advances in the health care system which enabled more 
sophisticated tests and procedures, previously provided only 
in the acute care setting, to be performed at ambulatory or 
outpatient sites. At the same time payment programs were 
developed which provided incentives to encourage this shift. 
Medicare reimbursement shifted from retrospective payment for 
costs to prospectively determined prices.
In the past two decades medical technology has progressed 
by such leaps and bounds that costs have become astronomical. 
With this high tech advancement has come the possibility to 
prolong life, even to the point of anatomical vitalism, i.e., 
keeping the body alive when no hope of recovery is present.
With the advent of the 1990s, most medical care is 
provided to the growing population of elderly patients with 
chronic diseases. Though a conceivable balance between the 
rising costs and seemingly insatiable demands for high-tech 
health care may have been anticipated, they have not been 
adequately addressed by either health care professionals and
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planners, or economists.
Many health insurance companies attempt to control costs 
by setting limits on the amount covered and the length of a 
stay allowable for a particular illness or type of surgery. 
For those patients who are irreversibly ill, with little or no 
quality of life to be experienced or enjoyed, families often 
demand that every possible test, procedure, and treatment be 
performed on the patient, even if it is against the patient's 
expressed wishes. Such a violation of an individual's rights 
has become a major focus in ethical debates concerning patient 
autonomy and the right to refuse treatment.
Often these demands are with little or no consideration 
of the expense incurred by the medical institution and society 
when there is limited health insurance, finances, or nothing 
but Medicare to cover only a minimal portion of the patient's 
bill, for which the family is not responsible. That is, in 
the case of Medicare law dictates that the family is not 
financially responsible for anything beyond the established 
deductible not covered by Medicare.
However, in most cases the family refuses or cannot 
afford to pay the deductible, or that amount of the bill not 
covered by insurance. It then becomes necessary for the 
hospital to "write-off" this bill as a "no pay," or compound 
the expense by turning the bill over to a collection agency.
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Public Policy by Design: An Attempt to Meet the Needs in 
Health Care
Though there is no particular order in the evolution of 
these policy designs, a brief overview will be given in order 
to better understand the intent of each model.
"Welfare Economics" attempts to "replicate for the public 
sector the decisions that would be made if private markets 
worked satisfactorily."^ Such an attempt to realize aggregate 
net benefits [or utilities] which are accruing to individuals 
would necessarily require "distributive value judgments [and 
cost-benefit analysis] about the relative worth of 
individuals."43 The self-serving, rational rich man, genius, 
or noted politician would receive a greater share of the 
benefits than the pauper, the mentally retarded, the person of 
average intellect, or the blue collar worker.
By virtue of its design, and in order to realize the
"aggregate net benefit," distribution of desired goods would 
be based on the axiom of "the more valuable the citizen, the 
greater the benefits received." While this may not be the 
original intent of such a policy, the reality is that those
who understand and control the system gain the most.
The "Public Choice" model is similar to welfare economics
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in that it too recognizes the realities of rational, self- 
serving, maximizing individuals, in particular, the political 
leaders who are in charge of design and the making of 
policies. "Unlike welfare economics, though, public choice 
admits of no benevolent, public-spirited, unitary govern­
ment."^
The system tends to be controlled at a higher level of
government, rather than at a lower and possibly more
responsive level, with the idea that equity between persons
and regions will be ensured.While the spirit of this model
may present the idea of intended equity, the reality is that
the rich get richer and the poor get lost in the shuffle.
In the "Social Structure" approach, there are a number of
social theory models which establish its foundation:
Functionalism explains individual and 
collective behavior; . . .Symbolic action
theory interprets behavior; . . .Role theory
assumes that people adopt the roles that
promote their social acceptance;
Socioeconomic determinism regards behavior as 
being determined by social and economic 
conditions; . . .Interest Theory contends
action is based on a rational pursuit of real 
interests; . . . and Action Theory sees
rationality only in terms of subjective 
perception and attitudes.^®
Ibid., 50.
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This structure has been utilized in areas such as health 
care, public education, law enforcement, urban policy, 
antipoverty programs, and the criminal justice system. While 
seemingly beneficent in its intent, there has been a large gap
between what it offers in principle and what is received in
practice. Part of the problem is identified in the "frequent 
lack of policy applicability." While focusing on the
advancing of "disciplinary knowledge," effective public policy 
is left undone.^'
Two other major contributing factors are that: (1)
demographic variables often play a larger role than variables 
open to manipulation by public policy; and (2) even when 
manipulable factors loom large, they often lie outside the 
jurisdiction of the institutions responsible for the issue or 
problem at hand.'’®
While the social structure model may have had its
beginnings in the 1960s, it is still a working model which 
fails to adequately provide for an equitable and workable
system of practical social reform. It has helped to establish
a growing mind set of "rights" centered expectations by
individuals from government-sponsored programs and services in
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general, with health care services being a prime example.
Similar to the social structure, the "Information 
Processing" model utilizes many subspecialty disciplines from 
the natural and social sciences. "Individuals are seen as 
making decisions based on some internal, simplified model of 
an external situation."<* This approach views the government 
as a collection of various structures with their own agendas, 
but unlike the public choice model, these structures are not 
considered as means of aggregating the preferences of 
"rational utility maximizers."^"
This system is comprised of so many varying theories and 
agendas that no one particular group is willing to take 
responsibility for the weighing of values and the making of 
decisions. This model is the epitome of the typical 
bureaucracy associated with government agencies, where no one 
(individual or department) seems to be aware of what anyone 
else is doing. To get a straight answer is extremely 
difficult.
The "Political Philosophy" model is comprised of 
political science, philosophy, law, and an "offshoot in 
economics and sociology."^ On the plus side, this system
Ibid., 84
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views the individual as someone who merits moral consideration 
and therefore is central to the models' design, directing its 
intent toward the individual's interests and rights. The 
negative is that while man is considered a moral, sentient 
being with various needs, there are little consensuses on how 
these needs are to be defined or met.
Individual preferences that tend to conflict with the 
principle of human dignity are excluded before being entered 
into the utilitarian calculus. Part of the problem common to 
this policy formation is that there is a conflict between the 
ideas of equality, utility and rights, with a minimal 
consensus on the identity or potential resolution of any of 
these issues.“
The Rising Cost of Health Care: Who's Going to Pay the Bill?
The reality is that there is a price tag on health care 
which must be paid for by someone— i.e., individuals with 
insurance, private pay, or government programs. Perhaps to 
better understand the economic factors involved, a cost shift 
model description, based on the following figures, will serve 
to illustrate the inequitable distribution of costs of health 
care to society.
Ibid., 109.
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Type of Coverage Average Cost Per Patient Dav Patient Davs
Medicare $759 35,585
Medicaid $872 4,313
Self-Pay $660 4,137
Commercial (Insurance) $956 3,692
All Others (HMO's,PPO’s) $994 14,011
Before getting into the analysis of the Cost Shift Model, 
a background is needed in how hospitals are currently being 
paid for the services rendered. Medicare reimburses hospitals 
a fixed amount based on the principal diagnosis of the 
patient. These classifications are known as Diagnostic 
Related Groups, DRG's. There are 492 total DRG's presently 
used by Medicare.
Initially, the DRG program was designed to reward 
efficient providers of health care and force the inefficient 
to improve their delivery systems or face closure; however, it 
has turned into a budget reconciliation tool for Congress. 
Medicaid reimburses hospitals on a per diem rate, a fixed 
amount per each day in the hospital and caps the total number 
of days per diem at twenty. Charity and uncollectables are 
the accounts not collected due to the financial limitations of 
the patient.
With this background, the Cost Shift Model will 
demonstrate the impact each of the groups noted above have on 
the charges hospitals make to the insurance companies and 
charges incurred by those individuals without insurance
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coverage.
The first graph reflects the average number of days, per 
payer group, over the fiscal year 1995. The total number of 
days for each payer group indicates the total average of 
patients for that year. That is, the daily census of patients 
in a particular hospital is calculated. At the end of the 
fiscal year, the daily censuses are totaled to give the number 
of patient days. The daily census can be broken down to 
reflect payer type. For example. Medicare reflects 35,585 
days, which indicates approximately 100 Medicare patients were 
in a particular hospital on any given day. This average is 
determined by dividing the total patient days (according to 
payer group) by the number days in a year.
The second graph reflects the average cost of $848 per 
patient day, assuming that the cost to provide the care is 
equal for all patients. The graph also reflects the payer mix 
based on patient days and, as can be seen. Medicare represents 
the largest payer group for the hospital.
Graph 3 represents the cost per patient day for all 
payers, assuming all payers are paying billed charges while in 
the hospital and that the hospital's net income from 
operations is 8% (a "profit" is needed by hospitals— even the 
"not for profit" hospital— to generate the cost needed to keep 
facilities and equipment updated). Assuming this 8% net 
income, the charge per patient day would be $916.
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Graph 4 focuses on the average amount of $759 which 
Medicare reimburses per patient day, in comparison to the 
total average charge of $916 per day. The amount not paid by 
Medicare must be shifted to the other payer groups, if the 
hospital is to achieve its 8% net income. Distributed evenly 
over the other patient days, the amount not paid by Medicare 
results in charges increasing from $916 per day to $1163 per 
day to cover costs and gain the necessary 8% net income. Even 
if the hospital wanted to just break even, the financial 
considerations would still require the hospital to shift the 
burden to other payers since Medicare reimburses at less than 
cost.
The next graph reflects the amount Medicaid actually pays 
in relationship to the new charges of $1163. Since Medicaid 
pays only $484.04 per patient day there is a $679.00 per 
patient day shortfall, which, again, must be redistributed to 
the remaining payer groups. This results in an average 
increase of $195 per patient day.
Graph 6 illustrates the additional 21% cost shift to 
other payer groups due to the shortfall from Medicare and 
Medicaid reimbursements. Additional factors include charity 
write-offs and those who do not pay their bill; these are not 
reflected in the chart because they are in a totally different 
account. They are mentioned only to indicate the additional 
burden passed on to the primary payer groups. As can be seen,
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the total burden has to be shifted to the remaining groups 
made up of those insured" and self-pays, resulting in the 
average cost of $1520 per patient day.
The Cost Shift Model clearly demonstrates the burden that 
Medicare, Medicaid, charity and no-pays have placed on health 
care costs. The shift in these costs increased prices almost 
100% over costs to provide the care claimed as a "right, " and 
by shifting this burden to the insured and self-pays, there 
has been, in effect, an implementation of another tax on those 
paying for health care. This "tax" burden will continue to 
grow as the government (state and federal) uses this 
reimbursement system in an attempt to keep the budget deficits 
from growing.
One possible solution to the real dilemma in health care 
allocation was found in the proposed reform in Oregon, in 
1989. "The Oregon Basic Health Services Act mandated 
universal access to basic [health] care, but also included 
rationing services to those individuals who are Medicaid 
recipients."^ If no new resources or funding were added, the
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While the HMO, etc. group reflects an increase in realized 
costs, the actual amount paid will depend upon the fixed terms 
of the contract.
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Medicaid recipients would be worse off, but the current
inequality between the poor and the rest of society would be
reduced. As pointed out by Dr. Kitzhuber, in his paper
presented to the Estes Park Institute:
The Oregon Health Plan should not be viewed as 
a solution, but rather as a political 
strategy— a process to achieve consensuses on 
the policy objective and principles of reform 
and a framework in which resource allocation 
and reallocation can take place.
With the Oregon Plan came the systematic rationing of 
health care services. In a country that has adhered to a 
social principle of universal access, the question of health 
care rationing seemed almost inconceivable. The truth is that 
in the past the reality of costs and limited resources has 
never been based on a conscious public policy but on a cost
shift basis which was allowed by the willingness of third
party payers to absorb the actual cost incurred.
"Widespread third party insurance coverage and the
ability to cost shift created the illusion that health care 
was free, since both providers and consumers were insulated 
from the true cost of treatment decisions."^® With this 
misconception came the expectation, by consumers, that not
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only access but everything the health care system had to 
offer, including high tech and experimental procedures, were 
theirs for the asking. Health care providers were also 
allowed to enjoy the luxury of "employing all treatments 
available, regardless of the cost, as long as some potential 
benefit, however slight, might result.
A cogent argument could be made that the cost of 
universal access was being paid for by society. But, with 
more of the costs being shifted to the provider community, 
i.e., hospitals and physicians, by the "cost containment" 
measures instituted in the 1980's, they were soon unable to 
absorb them. What was once subsidized care in an institution 
or practice began to show up as uncompensated care. And when 
a provider or institution reached a point of being unable or 
unwilling to absorb any additional uncompensated care, they 
began to require that individuals pay the costs themselves.^®
One of the great ironies of the health care system in the 
U.S. is that the more money is pumped into the system, the 
more people are squeezed out of the system. One of the great 
hypocrisies of this system is that those who are most likely 
to be "squeezed out" are not those who are unemployed or
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retired, but those who are working.
If an individual doesn't have health care insurance or 
private resources to pay for health care, access to the health 
care system is likely to be lost. This is because the 
individual is forced into a growing coverage gap, either 
because there is a delay or avoidance in seeking treatment out 
of concern for how to pay for it, or the inability to find a 
provider who will see the individual as a patient.
Currently, this coverage gap encompasses approximately 35 
million people on any given day, the majority of them workers 
with dependents.59 Individuals between the ages of 19-24, 
account for 20.3% of the population who are currently 
uninsured, and an additional 13.6% of the uninsured population 
falls between the ages of 55 and 64. In 1991, health care 
expenditures constituted 12.4% of the GNP, and for the 
beginning of 1992, the figure was in excess of $750 billion 
for the first quarter alone.
To better illustrate the reality of this dilemma: Assume
a person earns an annual salary of $7,500 to support a family 
of four. He is not eligible for Medicaid because he makes too 
much money. His rent is $250 a month and food and utilities 
cost another $300 a month. This takes $6,600 of his annual 
income of $7,500, leaving only $900 a year for clothing,
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miscellaneous expenses, health care, and transportation.
What happens when he or one of his family members gets 
sick? One trip to the emergency department at the local 
hospital could easily consume one-third of the family's annual 
discretionary income. It is difficult for him to find a 
physician who will take a new patient— particularly a 
medically indigent patient. What is he to do? He waits. He 
waits until the problem is so severe he can't wait any longer. 
As a last resort he goes to the emergency room, where the cost 
for treatment has increased because the condition has 
worsened.
Emergency rooms are becoming a primary source of health 
care intervention for many people. As a result, what we are 
seeing is a direct consequence of implicit social and 
legislative rationing decisions for which there is no 
accountability. Premature infants are dying from respiratory 
distress because their mothers did not receive prenatal care. 
Young adults are brought in in a diabetic coma, with serious 
wound infections, and pneumonia all because they delayed 
treatment and have never been educated in self-care with diet 
and insulin. These situations are a result of individuals 
waiting for treatment because they did not know how they were 
going to pay for the treatments received. This is rationing 
of health care in a very real and negative sense.
In addition to the tragic and dramatic impact on
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individuals, the health care crisis is also affecting the 
major payers of health care, i.e., the government and business 
community. In spite of efforts to protect themselves from the 
cost shift, both sources are buckling under the sheer 
magnitude of expenditures for health care. Federal spending 
has increased by approximately 13% per year over the past 
twenty years, accounting for the second fastest growing 
deficit after interest on the national debt.
While the Oregon Plan did not propose to solve the health 
care dilemma, it did incorporate the primary principles that: 
"(1) there is a social obligation to guarantee universal 
access to a basic level of health care, (2) reasonable or 
necessary limits on resources mean that not every beneficial 
service can be included in the basic level of health care, and 
(3) a public process, involving consideration of social 
values, is required to determine what services will be 
included in the basic level of health care."®°
The current trend in attempting to provide medical care 
for a reduced price is found in the concept of managed care. 
While there are certain basic elements which help reduce costs 
and provide coverage for more people, it does not provide 
universal access. It limits choices and services to 
recipients, what doctors can offer or even inform their
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patients about regarding options of treatment, and the 
administrators and insurance companies are getting richer.
While the term "managed care" has a ring of better 
utilization, the reality is that what is being managed is 
money and people, offering less coverage for a greater profit. 
The shift in health care delivery has gone from a patient- 
based to payer-based system, with the "ideal client" as one 
who never submits a claim. In reality, what managed care 
describes is a variety of price and use control strategies 
designed by private insurers and health-care-provider 
conglomerates.
According to one prominent health maintenance 
organization (HMO) executive, people are seen as numbers, not 
patients, which makes decisions about services provided much 
easier. "Just like Ford, we're a mass production medical 
assembly line, and there is no room for the human equation in
our bottom line. Profits are king."®^
While reductions in cost and the utilization of resources 
are necessary, by necessity limits must be placed on rampant
use of health care resources, "managed care" does not provide
an equitable or ethical plan of providing health care.
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Where Do We Go From Here?
Health care and the common good can only be adequately 
and equitably realized from a utilitarian perspective. The 
question of "fairness" may be raised, but is not the issue in 
this or any other proposal for restructuring the health care 
system. If the objective is to provide health care, we must 
recognize that health care is not synonymous with health— it 
is a means to an end, not an end in itself. Access to basic 
health care may be a positive right for individuals, and in 
keeping with the welfare of the common good, but not an 
exclusive right for some at the expense of others.
Reducing health care to claim rights is an absurdity, 
especially if the system continues to be saturated with 
demands equated with rights— at no realized cost for some. 
The reality is that rights may be claimed, but when economic 
and resource factors are ignored, the system will not and 
cannot bear the burden. When a system collapses, there is 
nothing left to claim as a right. The health care "source" is 
not an eternal fountain of youth, it can and will run dry of 
funding, resources, and accessibility.
"The problem with most health care proposals today is 
that they start at the bottom of the matrix with a completed
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'plan' and then try to 'sell' i t . N o n e  of these "proposed 
solutions" have been grounded in or built around a consensus 
of objectives and principles. Rather, they seem to be founded 
on politics rather than policy, offering a "quick fix" based 
on short term economic interests.
The common good and health care is not an easily 
definable term, but a societal experience, based on equitable 
access to basic health care. We will continue to advance in 
medical technology and capabilities, however, the reality is 
that all individuals are not equal in their ability to pay the 
price for high-tech medical care.
Perhaps the most valuable, just and ethical solution for 
the common good is to develop a system which recognizes that 
providing preventive care for thousands of people is more 
efficacious than one experimental procedure, costing $200,000, 
which benefits one. "We must sacrifice the freedom that has 
allowed us to avoid the reality that we have become obsessed 
with providing health care as opposed to improving health.
To date, perhaps the best or closest model of a 
universally accessible and utilitarian form of health care 
provision is found in Hawaii. In 1974, the "Prepaid Health
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Care Act (PPHCA)" was enacted in Hawaii, establishing an 
extremely successful law which mandates employer health care 
coverage.®® This PPHCA plan ensures that costs are shared 
between employers and employees, with the employee paying as 
much as fifty percent of the premium cost.
By law, the employer must provide a minimum of basic 
services as defined in Section 393-7 of the mandate. This 
section covers the basics associated with hospitalization, 
surgery, after care, necessary home, office, and hospital 
physician visits, necessary laboratory and radiology tests 
necessary for diagnosis and treatment, and maternity benefits. 
Under this basic-standard benefit plan, no employed person can 
be rejected, and the PPHCA's "indirect coercion of the 
insurers to more effectively treat patients with chronic 
disease rather than reject them, . . . result in a more cost- 
efficient system."®’
By comparison, Hawaii's overall health care costs are 
lower than the rest of the nation (7.8% of the gross state 
product compared to the U.S. gross domestic product of 11.2%), 
but also lower than Sweden (9.0%), Canada (8.6%), Germany
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(8.2%), and the Netherlands (8.5%).®® The key seems to be that 
everyone must pay and play; the young and the healthy must pay 
into the plan along with those who have a greater need for 
health care and medical services.
Concerning the medical indigent, the Department of Health 
estimates the "gap group in financial need" to be
approximately 3.5% of the population, or about 35,000 people.®® 
In essence, what this plan has done is to reduce the number of 
uninsured and provided health care coverage for virtually all 
employees in Hawaii, creating a legitimate "right" to health 
care, and in turn, reducing the costs related to those
uninsured. This plan, as related to maximizing the good or
greatest benefit and the issue of rights, will be further
examined in a later chapter.
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Chapter 3 
Liberalism in Health Care: Equality and Responsibility of 
Access
Since president Clinton's proposal for health care reform 
in 1992, hospitals, businesses, and individuals have turned 
their attention to the various presented plans designed to 
meet the health care needs of the public. The President 
states that his intention is for every American to have access 
to a health care system with comprehensive benefits that can 
never be taken away."'°
Such a system calls for equality and justice as a primary 
component of access to a liberal health care system, raising
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The idea of a liberal health care system, as presented in 
this paper, is based on the utilitarian concept of equality in 
which each person's happiness and well-being counts as one 
unit, no more and no less, with the consequence being the 
realization of the greatest benefit for the greatest number of 
people. Autonomy is recognized and the idea of the self is 
realized in that each individual is capable of critically 
reflecting on the values that govern his socialization. 
(Michael Walzer, "The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism," 
Political Theory, Vol 18 (1990): 248). This theory is not 
independent of some concept of the good for man or a 
particular conception of the good life and what it is that 
gives value to that life. In this theory the good requires 
having equal access and treatment to health care which will 
help to restore a person's health when possible; that which 
gives value to his life is the realization or hope of physical 
or mental well-being and the ability to resume a productive 
life, as determined by the individual, allowing him to 
contribute to the aggregate good. The main goal of such a 
health care plan is that an individual can access the system
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the question, "How is this to be accomplished?" The major 
difference between the present reality and the President's 
proposal for the future is that those who currently have no 
insurance would have coverage and insurance companies would 
pay for the health care received, rather than hospitals 
writing off the bill, if the patient doesn't qualify for 
Medicaid.
One problem not addressed in all the various proposed 
plans is how to avoid the expenditure of health care resources 
and dollars on futile treatment. That is, medical care which 
is ineffectual, which will be of no physical benefit to the 
individual, may or may not be covered by any insurance plan 
and will certainly not be paid for by the individual, his 
estate or his family. The purpose of this chapter will be to 
describe the current realities of health care, and examine the 
positive and negative attributes of a liberal approach to
with the expectation of being treated equally for physical or 
mental conditions, but cannot expect preferential treatment 
which would deprive others of the same type treatment. The 
principle of utility presented in this theory contains not 
only a sense of responsibility for individual actions but 
holds the individual responsible for his nonactions, that is, 
an unwillingness to make changes or concede to the 
inevitability of a particular situation. For example, the 
person with AIDS who continues to have sex with whomever, 
jeopardizing the lives of others. Or, the family member who 
refuses to allow intensive care medical treatments to be 
stopped when all such treatments are futile. (This additional 
notion of responsibility for nonactions is based on Kai 
Nielsen's, "Against Moral Conservatism," Ethical Theory: 
Classical and Contemporary Readings, Louis P. Pojman, ed., 
(California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1989), 181.
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health care, with the primary focus on those cases which call 
for extraordinary or futile care and treatment with no hope of 
the individual's r e c o v e r y .
I will address the inequalities perpetuated by the 
futility of some treatments, (e.g., in the case of Baby K, an 
anencephalic born in 1992, and Helga Wanglie, an eighty-five 
year old female who suffered severe anoxia in 1990). In these 
two cases alone, such futile treatment takes intensive health 
care resources and dollars away from, not only those with 
insurance, but also those who can't even afford basic health 
care. In addition, such inappropriate continuation of medical 
care must be paid for through higher costs in premiums and 
health care expenditures by others.
I will then describe how a liberal, sphere-specific 
utilitarian health care system can provide equal access to 
medical treatment. Such action, not only respects the rights 
of the individual to reasonable health care, but also, it 
takes a realistic and humane approach to minimizing or 
eliminating futile medical treatment. The question then is, 
"How is a liberal system to address this problem?"
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References to a liberal health care system will mean that 
all individuals have access to the system, and each individual 
is to be treated equally within the system, according to his 
ability to respond to treatment. Futility of treatment will 
refer to medical intervention that cannot and will not achieve 
the goals of its action, that is to restore a general state of 
health.
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The Current Realties of Health Care
In spite of the various claims by different factions of 
both the liberal and conservative camps, every individual does 
have access to health care in some form or fashion. Those 
individuals and families who still have health care insurance 
realize the benefits either as part of an employment package 
or as a result of paying premiums for health care insurance. 
But an increasing number of people have lost or will lose 
their health care insurance benefits due to unemployment, not 
being able to continue making payments for medical insurance, 
or because benefits have been cut by their employer because of 
rising costs.
Currently, it is estimated that more than two million 
Americans will lose their health care coverage every month; 
some will get it back, but ultimately the numbers will add to 
the more than 37 million who will go without health care 
coverage.^* Out of these 37 million, more than 9 million are 
children who will not be covered under some form of health 
care plan."""
In spite of these increasing numbers, and the claims that 
health care is not accessible to many Americans, health care
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is available, on a more limited basis, to individuals who 
cannot wait for some more equitable plan which will allow them 
to maintain their health care benefits, pride, and dignity. 
Currently, only a fraction of the cost of treatment by those 
individuals without medical insurance is being covered by 
Medicaid.
Regardless of the decrease in health care coverage, 
medical treatment is still needed. However, more individuals, 
most without insurance, come to emergency rooms to seek 
treatment for various physical ailments and symptoms. Then 
there are those who, because of an accident and injury, are 
brought to the hospital. In addition, most of those 
individuals without medical insurance coverage or money to pay 
for treatment, wait until they are so ill that hospitalization 
is required, which adds to the bill which they cannot pay. 
The reality is that health care costs, and this care must be 
paid for by someone.
Part of the current problem is perpetuated by the rapid 
advancement of medical technology, life-prolonging procedures 
(e.g., heart, liver, and kidney transplants), which lends 
itself to the public's frequent unrealistic expectations of 
medicine and technology, which has outstripped the afford­
ability of health care and the ethics of humane and reasonable 
treatment. Just because the potential exists for prolonging 
the physiological characteristics of a person, do such
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possibilities negate the responsible and realistic use of 
medical resources?
"Between 1980 and 1992, American health care spending 
rose from 9 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to 14 
percent. Without reform, spending on health care will reach 
19 percent by the year 2 0 0 0 . The question then is, "Does 
a view that 'life' is sacred and should be maintained at all 
costs warrant an open ended ticket to an already overextended 
system?" This, of course, would depend upon with whom you are 
talking.
Such instances raise the additional question, "Who's 
being treated in such cases where there is no hope for the 
individual's recovery," yet treatment continues because of 
family wishes? Certainly this cannot be considered an 
equitable and just system, one which neglects the needs of 
basic health care for children and the elderly, while allowing 
hundreds and thousands of dollars to be spent daily on 
individuals whose sole existence depends on tubes and 
machines.^
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Two such cases involve Baby K, who by court order is still 
being treated, and Helga Wanglie, who eventually died. In 
spite of her husband's success in obtaining a court order to 
continue futile treatment.
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Liberalism, Autonomy and Health Care
In one of Bob Dylan's songs he sings that "The times, 
they are a changin'..." and so it is within the health care 
system. We have seen technology advance at a tremendous rate 
of speed and machinery become outdated before it hits the 
market. We have come to recognize the right of autonomy of 
the individual to have input into his treatment or whether to 
even receive treatment.
Physician paternalism, "Dr. knows best," has been 
challenged and treatment on demand has become a current 
reality. For example, a patient is seen in an emergency room 
for a minor head injury; x-rays are taken and the individual 
requests a CAT scan, so the doctor orders it for fear that he 
may return with his lawyer claiming that "not everything was 
done to make sure my head was okay."
With every positive there is always the possibility for 
a negative, and in spite of the shift to respect for patient 
autonomy, all the technological advances, and the possibility 
to prolong life, the reality is that people are born and 
eventually die. There are some things that individuals demand 
and technology cannot fix or cure. This is where the 
breakdown occurs in our current system of health care, and 
most likely in any of the plans currently being considered in 
the President's proposed health care reform.
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A liberal system of health care and the notion of 
autonomy does not mean access to unlimited resources for 
everyone. Such a system does, however, acknowledge the 
individual as valuable member of that society, with certain 
rights and responsibilities. In this context, the "right" is 
to have access to needed medical care, with the 
"responsibility" of not abusing the system or expecting 
unwarranted or continued futile treatment.
The utility to be realized is the physical and mental 
well-being of each citizen by providing the means to maintain 
reasonably good health of all its members. Such a system also 
takes into account the realization that certain individuals 
will be or are limited in realizing "good health" by virtue of 
physical limitations and abnormalities.
This sphere-specific utilitarian based health care system 
recognizes the right of the individual to live how he or she 
might choose, with the understanding that there will be no 
discrimination or refusal of reasonable treatment should 
medical treatment be needed. For example, the person who 
smokes runs a greater risk of contracting lung cancer. While 
every reasonable or efficacious treatment would be made 
available, in the end stages of the disease process, only 
comfort care and hospice would be available.
Another example is the cancer patient who has had 
numerous treatments of chemotherapy and radiation therapy,
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with no evidence of remission. Ideally, the patient would 
receive palliative care and kept as free of pain as possible, 
without being subjected to further painful and futile 
treatment. Realistically, many patients do not want addi­
tional treatment but agree to such treatments by the coercion 
of a paternalistic, egocentric doctor, or family members who 
often attempt to usurp the patient's stated wishes, refusing 
to give up hope.
In those cases where an individual is born with no hope 
of survival, or a person becomes terminal because of a certain 
type of disease process (e.g., cancer, AIDS, renal failure), 
physical injury, or persistent vegetative condition (e.g., 
stroke, anoxic brain injury, head trauma) treatment is often 
deemed futile and only serves to prolong the dying process. 
In such cases, the continuation of ineffectual medical 
intervention only serves to give a false sense of hope or the 
appearance of life which is sustained only by machinery, 
tubes, and medications. While efficacious and reasonable 
medical treatment should be used when there is hope for the 
individual to recover to some form of sentient and reasonable 
quality of life, the reality is that such recovery is not 
always possible.
Case One; On October 13, 1992, a baby (referred to as 
Baby K) was born at Fairfax Hospital, in the Washington DC
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suburb of Falls Church, Virginia. The baby was born 
anencephalic (i.e., born without a brain) and was immediately 
placed on a mechanical ventilator because of respiratory 
distress. Baby K's condition had been diagnosed prior to her 
birth, but her mother refused to terminate the pregnancy 
because of strong religious beliefs.
Within a few days after the birth, hospital medical 
personnel approached the mother about issuing a DNR order ("Do 
Not Resuscitate Order") and allowing them to withdraw 
ventilator support, arguing that the treatment given was 
futile and inappropriate in this case where no cure or hope of 
reversal of the condition was possible. Again, the mother 
refused on religious grounds, claiming that all life is sacred 
and should be protected, and that only God "should decide the 
moment of her daughter's death.
Over the first year of her life. Baby K required 
mechanical ventilation, on numerous occasions, in order to 
breathe, and she required a total of four months in the 
hospital's pediatric intensive care unit. In spite of 
hospital officials, physicians, and an ethics committee 
recommendations. Judge Hilton of the United States District 
Court, Alexandra Division, ordered that the hospital must
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provide aggressive life-sustaining treatment or be in 
violation of state and federal laws prohibiting discrimination 
against the handicapped, child abuse, and the Emergency 
Medical Treatment Act."'®
Hilton cited the Fourteenth Amendment as extending to 
guarantee the right of parents to make medical decisions for 
their children. He "concluded that the First Amendment, which 
guarantees the free exercise of religion, also applied, 
because the mother's decision was based on a religious 
conviction that all life is sacred."’'®
Regarding Hilton's citing of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
there is no constitutional right or provision for the use of 
all possible medical technology in sustaining anyone's life; 
"the Fourteenth Amendment says that a state may not deny equal 
protection of the laws. Concerning the mother's arguments 
related to her religious conviction, the moment of her baby's 
death was when she was born.
If it was not for mechanical ventilation to sustain her
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nutrition and hydration. Baby K's life would cease. Her 
"life" would end not because the machinery was turned off but 
because there is nothing there physiologically to support her 
life functions on its own.
Three months later, the case was heard in the United 
States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit. Judge Hilton's 
decision was affirmed by a panel of the Fourth Circuit, with 
the opinion written by Judge Wilkins. The panel did not, 
however, affirm Judge Hilton's rulings concerning discrimi­
nation against the handicapped or state and federal child 
abuse laws. Its decision only affirmed Hilton's ruling that 
failure to provide emergency treatment needed by Baby K would 
violate the federal Emergency Medical Treatment Act. It also 
held that the "hospital was not authorized to decline to 
provide stabilizing treatment which it considered morally and 
ethically inappropriate."®^ There was, however, a dissenting 
and filed opinion by Senior Circuit Judge Sprouse, which 
essentially stated that Baby K's unique medical condition, 
though tragic, "should be regarded as a continuum, [and] not 
as a series of discrete emergency medical conditions to be
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considered in isolation."®^
Case Two: Helga Wanglie was an eighty-five year old,
well-educated and active woman who on December 14, 1989,
tripped over a rug, fell and broke her hip. She was 
hospitalized at Hennepin County Medical Center, Hennepin, 
Minnesota, underwent surgery, and began rehabilitation over 
the next five months. During this time she suffered several 
cardiopulmonary arrests, and on May 23, 1990, after another 
cardiac arrest, suffered severe anoxia (i.e., lack of oxygen 
to the brain) . She remained unconscious in a persistent 
vegetative state (PVS), her breathing sustained by a 
ventilator, and her nutritional and hydrational needs being 
met by artificial means (i.e., tube feedings and IVS) until 
her death on July 4, 1991.
In December of 1990, the physicians involved with Mrs. 
Wanglie's case determined that her condition was irreversible 
and approached Oliver Wanglie about withdrawing treatment. 
Mr. Wanglie indicated that his wife had not indicated her 
wishes prior to hospitalization, but that she had always been 
a very religious person, she considered life sacred, and he 
felt she would want life-support continued. A petition was 
filed with the Minnesota District Court by Dr. Steven Miles, 
a gerontologist who served as an ethical consultant to the
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physicians caring for Mrs. Wanglie, requesting that another 
guardian be named.
On July 1, 1991, Judge Patricia Belois "ruled that 'Miles 
has offered no evidence that Oliver Wanglie is incompetent to 
discharge the trust as Conservator of the Person of his wife. 
Judge Belois therefore denied Dr. Miles' petition and granted 
the [counter] petition filed by Mr. Wanglie. . . .»
Helga Wanglie's medical treatment served only to 
preserve her persistently unconscious state and dependence 
upon intensive medical care; therefore, further medical 
treatment was futile. There is also the issue of valuable 
resources being used that might have served to benefit a 
patient who would recover. The money spent on Mrs. Wanglie 
could have well provided immunization for thousands of 
children.
The list could continue, but the main issue is that 
valuable resources and finances were taken away, not only from 
those who are covered by insurance, but also, by those with no 
coverage. In intensive care units, sometimes the emergency 
demand for beds, adequate staffing, and available resources 
can exceed the need, and physicians can only provide intensive
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care to some patients only by denying it to others.®^
In both cases presented, the futile use of health care
dollars and resources is an ethical injustice to those who
could benefit from the financial and medical resources
expended on just these two individuals alone. It could be
argued that if health insurance was paying the bill (which
there is no indication of private insurance in either case),
it is the right of the covered recipient to receive the
benefits of the insurance.
This would be true if there was a probability of
successful response to treatment and recovery from the
illness. But, there is no indication in either case:
the goal of medical treatment is not merely to 
cause an effect on some portion of the
patient's anatomy, physiology, or chemistry, 
but to benefit the patient as a whole.. . .the 
ultimate goal of any treatment should be 
improvement of the patient’s prognosis,
comfort, well-being, or general state of
health.®^
The goals were not obtainable in either case.
Though every effort was made to restore Helga Wanglie's
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health and life, ultimately the court decision and continued 
treatment was for her husband. That is, it only delayed the 
inevitable of his having to say his final good-byes to his 
wife of fifty-three years.
It could be argued that the time allowed him to adjust to 
the reality that his wife could and would not recover, and he 
could begin his grieving process. But, this is hardly an 
adequate or ethical response, when the man-hours, resources, 
and intensive care bed could have been used for someone who 
would recover, or at least had a chance for recovery.
The same is true in the Baby K case. Does the mother's 
claim that "all life is sacred" warrant the ignoring of the 
reality of the situation? There was no higher brain function 
in her baby; there was only minimal lower brain function— as 
indicated by the necessity of sustaining her breathing by a 
ventilator.
According to Robert Veatch, Ph.D., who testified as an 
expert witness on the medical/ethical issues connected with 
this case at the court hearing, "Baby K's mother is searching 
for a neurologist and plastic surgeon who can construct a 
skull and cover it with skin in order to make her baby look 
normal."®® Obviously, the continued sustaining of Baby K's
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body is not for the baby, it only serves to perpetuate the 
mother's false hopes of normalcy for her baby. Such action 
only delays the inevitable realization that her baby is not 
and will not "be alive, and normal," while continuing to 
increase the medical bills for which other individuals will 
ultimately be responsible.
Sphere-Specific Utilitarianism and Health Care: Equal Access 
to Medical Care
Because health care is of fundamental importance in 
reducing pain and suffering, minimizing the risk of premature 
death, and helping to protect an individual's opportunity to 
pursue life goals, it is viewed as a primary good. Morally, 
the ideals of equality and justice require "that the health 
care system be universal, comprehensive, and equitable in the 
sharing of benefits and costs."®"'
To most effectively meet the health care needs of 
individuals in the United States, without sacrificing other 
important goals, the system must manage and treat effectively, 
allocate wisely, and ensure quality. "Controlling costs 
without unduly compromising quality is a moral, not just 
economic, imperative; it is how we achieve the most good for
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the members of our society with our limited resources.”®® This 
would also call for insurance companies to restrict their 
range of health care premiums, offer greater subsidies to 
smaller and lower-income groups, and require "health alliances 
and the national health board to ensure comparable quality and 
benefits in all plans."®®
A liberal system of health care, based on the principles 
of utilitarianism, would provide such an equitable system. 
The terms "equality," "justice," and "fairness" should be 
relative in all medical situations, and not be left to or be 
influenced by the subjective definition given by the person 
who demands and pleads for continued futile intensive medical 
care for his/her family member.
Quality care, effective treatment, and efficient 
management will ensure that individual health care needs will 
be met with high-quality care while minimizing the use of 
medical resources that fail to secure positive benefits for 
patients.®® The failure to secure positive benefits does not 
mean that if the prognosis is poor for the recovery of a 
patient, all further treatments should be deemed futile and
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the individual be sent home to die.
What this does mean is that when the evidence clearly 
indicates that further treatment will not alter the person's 
condition, or will only prolong the dying process, or 
necessitate that the individual will be maintained on life- 
support indefinitely, educated discretion should be used, such 
treatment should be withdrawn, the patient kept comfortable 
and be allowed to die with dignity.
While the concept of futility has been more narrowly 
defined, both clinically and legally, in my theory, futility 
is more broadly defined as medical intervention that cannot 
achieve the goals of its action. That is, to restore a 
general state of health, allowing the person to be capable of 
consciousness and feelings for life. Such medical futility 
may be measured qualitatively and quantitatively, each 
independent of the other.
The qualitative notion is when "any treatment that merely 
preserves permanent unconsciousness or that fails to end total 
dependence on intensive care should be regarded as 
nonbeneficial and, therefore, f u t i l e . T h e  quantitative 
perimeters are when the physician(s) concludes from previous 
experience, the shared experiences of colleagues in similar 
type cases, and evidence from empirical data that medical
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treatment is and will be useless.
With respect to autonomy, equality, and justice, if the 
patient expresses, or has given evidence that he wishes
everything to be done that is medically possible to sustain or 
prolong his life (e.g., in a living will), even when terminal 
or in a PVS state, then the physician is honoring the
patient's wishes. Such care and treatment may be a direct 
affront to the principle of utility and equality, but this 
would depend upon the physician's willingness to adhere to 
such principles.
However, when futile treatment is being given or
continued at the request or demands of the family or
significant others, such treatment, if against the wishes of 
the patient, is a direct act of paternalism against the 
patient, and an infringement upon the equitable availability 
and distribution of medical resources to other individuals.*2
Cases where futile treatment is being continued at family 
insistence confuses the issue and purpose of medical 
intervention. The argument of "fairness" is totally subjec­
tive, and irrelevant in such cases; for example, in the case 
of Baby K. While such a case is unfortunate, it is the 
mother's emotionally charged interpretation of "fair" and the
92
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court's order to continue the care realistically deemed futile 
by the medical staff. Such a decision genuinely violates the 
true sense of "fairness," "justice," and "equality," in a 
utilitarian based theory of liberal health care.
Liberalism in Health Care
A liberal, sphere-specific utilitarian based theory of 
health care could and would provide a system of health care 
that every American would have access to with comprehensive 
benefits that would not be taken away. That is, if the terms 
"equality," "justice," and "fairness" were objectively 
defined, and the current health care system were restructured 
administratively to include "that the health care system be 
universal, comprehensive, and equitable in the sharing of 
benefits and costs.
Insurance companies would be required to revamp their 
systems to allow for more equitable and competitive rates for 
health insurance coverage, with expanded benefits. Basic 
health care plans would need to be universal, with all 
businesses subsidizing the system, and allowing the option for 
supplemental insurance coverage for those who can and wish to 
purchase it.
In the sphere-specific utilitarian system I am proposing,
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it is a privilege with equal access. Health care is a service 
whose aim is to maintain the physical and mental wellness of 
individuals, which when they are physically well allows them 
to be self-actualizing (i.e., to be able to realize their 
potential, however limited that may be) , and, in turn, 
contribute either directly or indirectly to the greatest 
happiness or good for the greatest number of people. If there 
is a "right" involved, it is the right to access, not to 
expect or demand tests that are not necessary (e.g., a CAT 
scan for a minor head injury) or the gross misuse of health 
care resources, such as in the cases presented.
Liberalism in health care is not a free-ride system. 
Neither does it ignore the needs of individuals who cannot 
afford to pay for services rendered. A utilitarian system of 
health care recognizes these needs, and with reform hopefully 
will provide a service that the individuals in society can 
live with and benefit from, on a more equitable basis.
Such reform will not please everyone, and the system will 
certainly not meet the expectations and demands of some who 
will claim their "rights," or the "rights" of their family 
member, have been violated because the treatment has been 
deemed futile and stopped. Along with access comes 
responsibility, and sometimes the responsibility involves the 
realization that people die, and no amount of intensive 
medical treatment can reverse or alter the reality.
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Chapter 4 
Establishing a Theory of Moral Value Within a Sphere-Specific 
Form of Utilitarianism
Sphere-Specific Utilitarianism
While classical utilitarianism is basically defined as 
achieving the "greatest good or happiness," it is further 
equated with achieving or experiencing the greatest "good," 
over the potential "bad," for the greatest number. The 
general concept of the "greatest good for the greatest 
number," however, is too obscure when not defined from a 
particular or intentional point of utility to be achieved.
Even when a particular scenario is presented, for 
example, sacrificing one individual for the benefit of several 
others, this context still omits two major elements. One is 
that while it is true that the initial defining of 
utilitarianism must start with the general and proceed to the 
more specific, the sphere of life or context in which the 
situation may take place has been ignored.
Second, while social utility is of primary importance in 
a utilitarian theory, the individual need not be sacrificed 
for the greater good or net benefit. The reason is, the scope 
of moral action is not fixed but fluid and based on a 
multiplicity of events, with varying degrees of moral interest 
which are relevant only to the participants' proximity of the
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sphere of utility being examined.
It is my contention, therefore, that the "greatest good" 
or benefit must necessarily be defined from within a 
particular arena, not from some nebulous concept or subjective 
position about life or feelings in general. In other words, 
there must be a point of reference from which the theory can 
be grounded in order to be plausible. While certainly not 
new, my proposal is an ethical/moral theory which is sphere 
specific, based on the general notion of utilitarianism, and 
acknowledges the "rights" of the individual within the 
particular sphere being considered, in this case, the sphere 
of health care.
In this context, the premise of utility serves as the 
ultimate foundation from which all other principles are 
evaluated within the specific sphere or environment of health 
care. The principles deducible from and measured by the 
utility desired, and which serve as parallel-grounding 
notions, are beneficence, nonmaleficence, autonomy and 
justice.^ In turn, the utility or the good to be achieved in 
health care is realized or produced by compliance with these 
secondary or supporting principles.
As previously stated, though the theory presented is 
based on utilitarianism in general, it is different from other
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forms of utilitarianism in that it is sphere-specific. That 
is, it focuses strictly on a particular sphere which has or 
may have a direct effect on a person's life and the lives of 
individuals within a particular society, again, in this 
instance, the sphere of health care. However, any other major 
sphere of life could theoretically be plugged in and the same 
end realized, that is, the "greatest good" is achieved for the 
individual and society, not only in theory but also in 
practical application.
Admittedly, each primary sphere of life will have its own 
unique set of circumstances, calling for some modification of 
the theoretical and practical utilitarian applications in 
order to meet the ethical and moral dynamics of that 
particular sphere. In the sphere of health care, each 
individual would have access to equitable and comprehensive 
medical care conditioned only by his or her ability to respond 
to treatment. That is, futile medical care which no longer 
achieves the goal of its actions and does not restore the 
individual to a general state of health would be discontinued. 
In this case, only comfort or palliative care would be 
provided. Also, since utilitarianism is closely linked to 
economics, the efficient and rational use of resources is 
given primary consideration.
Another example is the sphere of public education, which 
will have its own set of relevant considerations in attempting
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to meet the primary good of providing education to the 
children of a particular society. In this sphere there is not 
only the general educational needs of children, but an 
additional factor is the special educational requirements of 
some which must be considered. Similar, in some respects, to 
the chronically ill person, the child with distinctive 
educational needs is still entitled to the same right of 
educational opportunities.
Another "human" sphere which has a principal affect for 
the individual and the community is the legal system. While 
the good to be realized is generally apparent, the dynamics of 
the system itself is, in many ways, similar to that of the 
health care system. A need exists; and while the precipi­
tating events leading to the need may vary, the goods (legal 
representation, legal and criminal justice, etc.) and services 
(law enforcement agencies, public defenders, etc.) are made 
available.
Any number of other human spheres with primary 
utilitarian considerations could theoretically be plugged into 
the principal formula and worked out to meet the needs and 
provide the same ethical considerations.
Two major components associated with my sphere-specific 
theory focus on: (1) the responsibility of the individual and 
society which play an important role in defining and achieving 
the "greatest good", and (2) the "right" of the individual is
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recognized in accessing the health care system. These ideas 
will be further developed and defined in subsequent chapters.
A New ^preach To Utilitarianism
While no one theory can provide a solution or even a 
universally acceptable position, perhaps the continuous 
reformation of a particular theory can provide an additional 
grain of intellectual and pragmatically relevant moral and 
ethical truth. I also readily admit that my account of 
utilitarianism is of an "impure nature," when judged according 
to Anne Maclean's classification,” and J.S. Mill's definition.
If the ideal notion is that the moral rightness or 
wrongness of an action is measured by the utility of 
maximizing the greatest happiness or "satisfaction of 
desires," then my version of utilitarianism falls short. For 
the reality is that there are and will be decisions and 
standards of conduct independent from or seemingly in conflict 
with the ideal notion of classical utility.
This diagnosis of "impure" is rendered in light of the 
"classical" or "pure" definition of utilitarianism, which 
"admits only utility as the measure of conduct, and. 
defines utility in terms of the satisfaction [or realization]
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of preferences or desires."®® However, when examined in 
relation to the sphere-specific notion of utility, the theory 
becomes grounded by the identified sphere of utility, not some 
generalized or abstract terms such as "happiness" or 
"desires." Apart from its own internal linguistic struggles, 
one particular advantage of utilitarianism over other theories 
is that it is the ultimate and grounding principle by which 
all other principles, morals, ethical positions, and virtuous 
actions are measured.
In general, the utility in a particular sphere is 
purposefully created or adopted to serve as a universal 
measure for the purpose of moral decision making and the 
resolution of conflict. In particular, the utility in the 
sphere of health care is to maximize the use of medical 
resources, e.g., equipment, procedures, medications, and 
health care providers, which serve to achieve the greatest 
good in helping to maintain and provide the health care needs 
of the members of a particular society.
Practical Reasoning and Utilitarianism
While theoretical support for a utilitarian system of 
medical care is of primary importance, pragmatic reasons for 
a sphere-specific utilitarian designed system of health care
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are just as vital. Five such reasons are as follows. First, 
since utilitarianism is closely linked to economics, the 
rational and efficient use of resources is by necessity a 
primary component.
Second, the function of morality is to serve as a guide 
to ethical human conduct, and the value or utility of health 
care is to achieve the greatest benefit for the largest number 
of people with the available resources. This, of course, does 
not mean that there are no negative or less than desirable 
outcomes, but the utility, intent, or "greatest good" of the 
sphere is maximized, decision-making or prima facie 
obligations^'^ become clearer, and the resolution of conflict 
is reduced.
Third, the obligation to benefit others comes from the 
principle of beneficent reciprocity. That is, if there are 
benefits received from society, then by virtue of this 
principle, society can expect and the individual has an 
obligation or responsibility in return to promote or 
contribute to that society's well-being or best interest.
Fourth, the specific intent of medicine is based on the 
principle of beneficence, that is, to do good, with a counter­
point of nonmaleficence, which is, to do no harm. The good 
desired, namely, providing health care and helping the sick
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return to some semblance of good health, when possible, calls 
for the reasonable or prudent use of medical resources.
Fifth, patient participation has become a recognized 
right, allowing greater involvement by the patient to accept 
or decline treatments and the use of health care resources. 
Such participation, while adhering to the ethical construct of 
autonomy, does not mean that autonomy is the sole driving 
principle, with a kind of egoistic utility as the underlying 
basis for the applicability of the principle.
Because health care touches so many lives and shapes so 
many experiences, important intrinsic and instrumental ethical 
values are at stake in determining and defining a health care 
system. While beneficence is a primary factor, the concept of
justice in distribution must also be a consideration in
determining the greatest good for society.
On Defining the Good
To define what the "good" means to an individual or
society often results in as many definitions as people asked. 
Naturally, the context of the term will further define and 
clarify what it is and how or why that "some thing" is desired 
and a particular action or consequence is considered "good." 
In this sphere-specific form of utilitarianism, the "good" is 
used to describe that which is positive and serves as a
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foundation for moral value and judgment in establishing 
guidelines and principles in the distribution of health care.
The basic premise of utility asserts that the ultimate 
criterion for morality is the maximizing of the social or 
aggregate utility, which, in turn, serves as a function for 
establishing moral values. In attempting to define that which 
is "good, " as opposed to that which is "bad, " the meanings of 
these words are often vague and controversial.
For example, Dan Brock lists four concepts which he 
considers to have value or good consequences: (1) happiness;
(2) the satisfaction of desires or preferences; (3) the 
promotion of welfare or interest; and (4) a notion associated 
with "ideal utilitarianism," that is, the morality of an 
action and its consequences are either intrinsically good or 
intrinsically bad.**
While Brock considers these terms mainly from a 
linguistic viewpoint, and the idea behind each term or phrase 
may convey an ideal consequence(s), the first two principles 
are more expressive of feelings or psychological states of 
satisfaction for the individual. Take, for example, the word 
or idea of "happiness." To attempt to equate happiness with
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the good, in relation to the aggregate, is automatically 
limited by its purely subjective nature. The same holds true 
for the principle of achieving satisfaction of desires or 
preferences. It is not clear what preferences or desires are 
being satisfied or defined as the good.
The third notion, "the promotion of welfare" is more in 
line with the intent of a sphere specific utility, but is 
still subject to further clarification. The fourth point, 
however, "the morality of an action and its consequences are 
either intrinsically good or intrinsically bad," ignores the 
fact that morality is flexible and is often subject to the 
aggregates perspective and the legal status of some actions.**
One of the major problems associated with the idea of 
good in general is that there is no societal sense of good or 
well-being. Many have become so self-focused, it seems 
society has lost the attention of others in comparison to the 
self. While it may be true that man is an end in himself, the 
realization of this "end" is and can only be in relation to 
others. Therefore, the conceptual context in which the 
"goodness" ("badness") of an action is defined can only be 
relative when there is more than one person.
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On Moral Flexibility and Ethical Values
"There are no ethics!" "There are no morals!" At least 
this is so in the sense of Plato's "The Forms," or some
nebulous set of ideals. It could be argued that from a 
theological perspective, the Ten Commandments set some 
standard for societal ethic, but what if a person (s) is not
familiar with or does not accept the Old Testament writing?
Perhaps the concept or some "innate" premise of the Golden 
Rule or sense of the ideal of common decency sets the stage 
for a societal ethic. What ever the answer, a claim that some 
set of moral constructs are well established is negated by the 
historical fact that there seems to be a continuously 
developing ethic(s) which expresses the moral development and 
attitude of a given society.
The "good" of utilitarianism in the context of this
writing is based on the ideal or ethic of "the greatest good" 
or "benefit over burden," for the largest number of people 
within a particular society, the United States, and within the 
specific sphere of health care. It is further defined by the 
considerations of limited resources, limited funds, the 
realization of the realistic limits of the art of medicine. 
There is also the cold, hard reality that medicine, 
physicians, technology, and individual wishes do not and 
cannot fix every disease, illness, or reverse the ever present
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process of dying.
More specifically, the procedure at hand is how to 
adjudicate the principle of sphere-specific utility with the 
concept of rights, which will be the theme in Chapter 5. 
Historically, the idea of rights associated with the theory of 
utilitarianism has been disputed as improbable as well as 
impossible.
Additionally, while many theorists have attempted to 
cause the demise of utilitarian theory, the fact remains that 
it is alive and well; the reality is that it is not easy to 
refute any moral theory completely. In truth, utilitarianism 
is well established, for it makes common sense and serves as 
a guide to moral human conduct, having both theoretical and 
practical viability.
While I do not intend to reject other ethical theories in 
opposition to my utilitarian position, I still believe 
utilitarianism to be the most plausible position, even in 
light of the attempt to adjudicate utilitarianism with the 
issue of rights. And, while the theoretical opposition to a 
utilitarian approach to validating rights has a long history, 
I believe there are two pragmatic reasons which offer support 
to my theory; these are: (1) the ultimate value or utility
realized appeals to man's common sense, and (2) the economic 
utility to be realized in health care is of primary importance 
to all concerned.
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While arguments may be leveled at the economics of health 
care, with claims that a life, for example, is not about 
money, the reality is, when we price ourselves out of 
affordable medical care, even for the wealthy and those who 
have some insurance, all arguments become mute. If the 
genuine concern by physicians and the public is with providing 
health care in a reasonable and just manner, in a way that 
will benefit the greatest number at an affordable rate of 
cost, then it seems that "utilitarianism is the only ethical 
theory consistent with the modern theory of rational behavior 
and a full commitment to an impartially sympathetic 
humanitarian morality.
My proposal is a theoretical and practical approach to a 
sphere-specific form of utilitarianism, which acknowledges and 
takes the individual's right to health care seriously, and 
produces a moral foundation for action which genuinely 
enhances the utility of a particular society. It must also be 
stated that utility will be society specific, for each country 
will have certain unique elements which will identify the 
spheres of utility to be achieved.
The greatest good to be realized in the United States, in 
relation to the specific spheres unique to this country, will
100
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certainly be achieved in a somewhat different fashion than in 
another country. While there may be some similarities of 
desires/ the history of establishing values and the moral 
fibre of that society will cause a difference in cultural 
recognition of the "good."
THE CŒ4M0N GOOD AND HEALTH CARE: A UTILITARIAN PERSPECTIVE
In Plato's Republic, Socrates speaks of various types of
education and comes to speak of a mythical doctor figure,
"Asclepias," who:
Introduced medical treatment for those who 
have a good constitution and lead a healthy 
life. If they get some specific disease, he 
gets rid of it by drugs or surgery, but tells 
them to go on leading their normal life so as 
not to make them less useful to the community.
But, he makes no attempt to cure those whose 
constitution is basically diseased. . . which 
can only lead to an unhappy prolongation of 
life. . .. [H]e thought that no treatment
should be given to the man who cannot survive 
the routine of his ordinary job, and who is 
therefore of no use either to himself or 
society.
While this may seem an extremely archaic and nihilistic 
view of providing health care, there is a sense in which the 
basic principle is still relevant to medical care today. 
Particularly in keeping with the proposed definition of the 
common good as "that which provides the greatest benefit for
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the greatest number of people," there is some relevance to 
limiting treatment and procedures in certain cases.
Realistically, there comes a point and time when no 
additional surgery, medication, treatment or high-tech 
gadgetry will ensure or provide any possible positive outcome 
or recovery for the patient, but will only delay the 
inevitable— i.e., death. Such exercise in futility only 
serves to enhance the physical and emotional suffering of the 
patient, and the family, not to mention the financial 
expenditures and depletion of valuable resources. But, even 
with a clearer description of the sphere and utility desired, 
certain difficulties are still present.
Identified Difficulties with Utilitarianism
As a consequence-based theory, utilitarianism provides 
that a decision will be reached by weighing the projected 
consequences of various actions and then deciding which action 
will produce the best possible moral consequences or net 
benefits. While this sphere-specific theory of utilitarianism 
can rightly be understood as a form of "situational ethics" 
and has many of the same general principles of act 
utilitarianism, it more clearly defines the sphere in which 
the good or benefit is to be achieved. This, in turn, sets 
the parameter which qualifies and quantifies the desired
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utility, and determines the efficacy of treatments in certain 
cases.
While the sphere of utility may be more clearly defined, 
one problem exists in that while it is generally assumed that 
the utility is for others, i.e., "the greatest benefit for the 
greatest number," the question remains whether or not the 
individual agent should be included in the utility equation. 
It would seem that based on the concept of equality and as a 
member of the identified society, the individual should be 
considered.
Utilitarianism acknowledges the general ethical principle 
of obligation, rights, and autonomy, in relation to the best 
possible good or benefit of identified utility. Accordingly, 
we will be better served if we allow the situation to 
determine the action employed or consequence d e s i r e d . F o r  
example, a physician may withhold information or even lie 
about a patient's condition in order to give hope to that 
patient.
From a positive perspective, depending upon the 
individual/patient, i.e., the emotional state, or prognosis, 
the lack of explicit diagnosis may allow time for more tests 
and a better idea of a prognosis for the patient. In other
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words, rules should sometimes be obeyed, and other times 
disobeyed, depending upon the best prediction of beneficence 
or the good to be achieved.
From a rule utilitarian position, particular judgments 
and actions are or should be guided by moral rules such as, 
"Do not lie, " which are justified by the principle of rule 
utility. Again, take the example of a patient and physician—  
except now the physician does not withhold information about 
the patient's condition. The good or beneficence achieved is, 
or would be, respect for the right of knowledge by the 
patient, respect for autonomy, and allowing the patient to 
begin dealing with or processing the facts and the possible 
prognosis or outcome (e.g., additional surgery, chemotherapy, 
or imminent death)
It is this writer's opinion that a sphere-specific 
utilitarianism best serves the needs arising in health care, 
and more specifically, addresses the issues of justice and 
equal access associated with health care. This view is based 
on the nature and method of health care and medicine in this 
society, and on the principal or consideration of consequences 
relevant to a specific set of circumstances. Case by case 
decision making, i.e., in relation to a patient, the prognosis
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or recommended treatment, and whether to begin a new 
procedure, or protocol, or discontinue treatment, is the only 
just avenue of providing health care.
This position necessitates the question, "What will be 
the maximum gain or consequence of doing the most good or, at 
least, the minimum of harm to or for the patient?" In regard 
to an individual, the general ethical principles of 
obligation, rights, and respect for autonomy, utilitarianism 
seems most congruent with consideration for the individual 
needs and situational assessment, providing the most good, 
i.e., health care, for a patient or the most number of 
patients, based on standard methods of practice in medicine.
Though the most reasonable or equitable consequences are 
desired, no theory is without its complications. First, as 
with any consequence, there are no certainties. Second, an 
analysis of the predicted consequence must be made to assess 
the potentially positive or negative results of the 
consequence desired. With this element comes the dilemma of 
whose values will be used to assess the "goodness" or 
"badness" of the results achieved.
Another "potentially serious problem with the 
consequence-based [theory] is that it is possible for the good 
of some to be gained at the expense of others, provided that
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the good outweighs the bad."^ °^  In turn, this may create "what 
is known as the problem of justice, namely, it is possible to 
have a morally correct action (in terms of consequence 
analysis) which is nonetheless unjust, thus violating a basic 
principle of e t h i c s . i n  addition, there is the problem of 
"trying to determine what constitutes the good and whether 
there is a single good for everyone or whether each person 
determines his or her own good."^°®
In his book, A Theory of Justice, John Rawls addresses 
the idea of a society as a rightly ordered group of people in 
which its institutions are organized in such a manner as to 
achieve the greatest balance of good or satisfaction for those 
belonging to that particular society.From the individual's 
perspective, based on the utilitarian model, his attempt is to 
achieve the greatest good or benefit for himself. Holding to 
this formula, the greater good for society would be based on 
the same principle, calling for the individual to acquiesce to
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the greater good or satisfaction of that particular society.^®® 
According to Rawls, " . . .  a society is properly arranged 
when its institutions maximize the net balance of 
satisfaction."^®® The idea of choice for the individual is 
enlarged to consider the choice of the aggregate. In relation 
to social justice, the principle is still equated to the sum 
of the whole, i.e., that which best benefits that particular 
society.
Concerning the principles of ethics, equated with the 
concept of a morally virtuous person or society, the two 
primary considerations are those of the "right" and the 
"good." Based upon this premise, the ethical theory is then 
determined by these two basic notions, i.e., the "right" and 
the "good." "The simplest way of relating them is taken by 
teleological theories: the good is defined independently from 
the right, and then the right is defined as that which 
maximizes the good.
Keeping in mind that in a teleological based theory the 
good is defined independently from the right. It then follows
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that those value judgments which are considered "good" are 
intuitively distinguishable by common sense, and the right is 
that which maximizes that which is considered good. In 
relation to health care, this would equate to the good being 
discriminatory decisions being made by the individual or 
family, giving consideration to the prognosis and potential 
for the patient's response to treatment and the probability 
for recovery.
These decisions would also give consideration to whether 
the continuation of treatment would only prolong the suffering 
of the patient. The expenditure of resources (i.e., 
medicines, lifesaving equipment, money) would also be a 
relevant consideration if the good of others would be better 
served by a decision which maximizes the benefit for society 
in relation to health care made possible by more conservative 
and rational decision making. Certainly these are emotionally 
charged decisions that must be made, but there is a certain 
amount of common sense and realistic resolve that goes with 
these choices.
The reality is that people die regardless of 
technological advances; the other side of this is that 
technology often only delays the reality of human finitude. 
The bottom line is that the best possible decision is 
"essentially a question of efficient administration," where
108
the distinction between persons is not a consideration.
A few case studies may best illustrate the viability of 
the sphere-specific utilitarianism methodology in relation to 
health care.
Case One: Juanetta is a 23-year-old female in end-stage
renal disease (i.e., her kidneys have ceased to function). 
Because of complex medical problems, Juanetta is not a 
candidate for a kidney transplant, from either a relative or 
cadaver. Juanetta comes to the clinic several days a week for 
dialysis, which takes several hours each visit. One day, 
during dialysis, Juanetta says that she is not feeling well 
and it seems that the dialysis is becoming less effective 
(which is often the case with end-stage renal failure 
patients). She says that this is the last time she will be in 
for treatment, for she has decided to let the disease end her 
life. There are many factors involved with this case, e.g., 
Juanetta's competence, her quality of life at this time, and 
the right of a patient to refuse further treatment.
Based on the principle of my sphere-specific utili­
tarianism, and if Juanetta's right to autonomy is taken 
seriously, her decision will be respected after some further
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clarification of the grounds and thought processes of her 
decision. With consideration for the principle of doing no 
harm and minimizing suffering, there comes a point in time for 
some patients that honoring the decision to end treatment is 
more beneficent than continuing the treatment.
Naturally, there are always additional factors to be 
considered, but the length of treatment and realization that 
end-stage renal patients ultimately succumb to the disease, if 
transplantation is not a viable option, is a primary factor in 
some cases. There is also the issue of respect for the 
patient's right to decide for or against further treatment, 
which reflects the primary ethical principle of respect for 
autonomy.
Case Two: In 1980, Massachusetts General Hospital
assessed the feasibility of a heart transplant program at 
their institution. Upon the decision of the twelve trustees 
of the board, the program was vetoed in favor of further 
evaluation of new procedures which would allow for further 
technological advancement and the potential for providing the 
good for the greatest number of patients at a later time.
Case Three: A five-year-old girl has been a patient for
three years because of progressive renal failure. Dialysis 
has been the method of treatment, with consideration for 
transplant as a possible option. Her mother proves to be
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incompatible, her two younger sisters are too young to be 
considered as possible donors. However, her father proves to 
be compatible.
It is the opinion of the medical staff that the 
transplantation is questionable, at best, and it is possible 
that the transplanted kidney will undergo the same disease 
process. The doctor met with the father and gave him the 
prognosis of minimal success of permanent reversal of his 
daughter's condition, even with his healthy kidney.
It is the father's painful decision not to donate, after 
considering the prognosis, the pain already suffered by his 
daughter, and admitting to his own fear. He asked the doctor 
to inform the other family members that he too (the father) 
was not histocompatible. The doctor was uncomfortable with 
honoring the father's request, but consented to inform the 
family that for "medical reasons" the father could not donate.
There are many factors to be considered in this case, 
both morally and medically. First, honoring the father's 
right to autonomous decision making must be recognized. There 
are also the issues of beneficence (doing good) and 
nonmaleficence (doing no harm), and truth telling. One 
argument, in the father's favor, is from the standpoint that 
the greatest good is realized from a financial consideration 
for his wife and two other children. This is over and against 
the potentially poor prognosis given of his daughter
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benefiting from receiving his kidney.
From a strict rule utilitarian view, the principle of "Do 
not lie" is compromised; however, from a sphere-specific 
position of utilitarianism, the father's position is morally 
justified. While it may not be the decision that someone else 
would make, the father's decision seems based on the lesser of 
two evils or burdens, given his daughter's prognosis.
In this particular case, there is the problem of whether 
the daughter has the right to receive her father's kidney. If 
she were of age, 18 years old or older, it would be her 
choice, if a kidney was known to be available. Of course, 
given the same scenario, it would still be the father's 
decision of whether or not to donate. While the argument 
could be made that the right to receive the kidney should be 
present regardless of age, the issue is still the girl's 
prognosis of benefiting from the transplant.
Each case is unique in its own right, and each represents 
an element(s) addressed from a utilitarian perspective. But, 
what of the rights of such patients, or prospective patients 
in case number two? Are there certain rights associated with 
health care? This topic will be explored in Chapter 4.
While these examples address some individual issues in a 
utilitarian system, what of society as a whole? As previously 
stated in Chapter 2, the Hawaiian system of health care 
provision seems to best epitomize the criteria set forth in my
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sphere-specific theory of utilitarianism.
Hawaii's Prepaid Health Care Act (PPHCA) meets both the 
theoretical and pragmatic qualifications of utilitarianism, in 
general, and my sphere-specific utilitarianism, in particular. 
First, it takes into account and meets the criterion for 
delivering the "greatest good," to the "greatest number," 
i.e., providing universal access to health care. Second, it 
acknowledges the needs of the individual, and endorses a 
"right" to access the health care system. And, while it is 
designed to cover virtually all employees in the state, 
provisions are made for those who are unemployed and 
uninsured.
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Chapter 5 
Adjudicating the Issue of Rights and Utilitarianism: 
Concerning The Language and Legitimacy of Rights
Since the time of Thomas Hobbes, individuals have 
employed the language of rights to buttress social, political, 
and moral arguments to make claims for reforms, and demand 
recognition and respect of the individual.This language of 
rights is even more prevalent and congenial to the liberal 
individualism pervasive in our modern society.
Regardless of their origin, rights are generally of two 
kinds, either liberty or claim rights,^* the distinction being 
that liberty rights are those which people have whether they 
request them or even know they exist. For example, the 
Declaration of Independence guarantees that individuals have 
the right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." 
It attributes to us the right to pursue happiness, not to 
happiness per se.
In the same way, the right to life is the right to self- 
preservation. Accordingly, the right not be physically
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attacked or harmed need not be requested in order to be 
enforced. There are established laws which ideally, in 
principle anyway, protect the individual from being physically 
assaulted, ensuring one's safety, or at least having the right 
to protect oneself or the right to legal recourse in the event 
of being physically harmed.
Claim rights, on the other hand, require that an 
individual "specifically request whatever they have a right 
to, in order for it to be received. The right to vote
serves as an example of a claim right, i.e., the individual 
must be of legal age, request and register in order to 
exercise this right. Incorporated into this broad category 
are welfare rights which more explicitly involve the idea of 
rights of access to goods; for example, a right to food, 
shelter, and education, and in this writing, the idea of a 
right to health care.
More clearly, a theory of rights specifies something 
which an individual should be free to have or do, invoking a 
sense of entitlement and e q u a l i t y . T h i s  does not mean, 
however, that there are no boundaries or circumstances in 
which the right may be strictly defined, limited or withdrawn.
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Neither does the term "free" mean free just for the asking or 
without cost. Even under the guaranteed right for an 
individual to pursue life, liberty, and happiness, or 
ownership of property, there may be certain limitations found 
within the exercise of these rights.
There also exists, in this notion of rights, a rather 
seemingly precarious relationship between the identified 
rights and the concept of equality. While a person may not 
actually be "entitled" to a particular thing, by virtue of the 
notion of rights and equality, he is entitled to equality in 
respect to that thing, "whether or not it is efficient to do 
so.""9
For example, under the First Amendment of the 
Constitution, there is the right to freedom of speech. The 
guarantee is the right to speak freely; a right to be equally 
free of constraints and impositions on whatever speaking one 
might wish to do, should the person be able to find anyone to 
listen. The right does not guarantee, however, that each 
speaker will be afforded the same arena or media coverage for 
getting their ideas across, or that they will even be heard, 
believed, or applauded.
The relation between the notion of rights and equality, 
therefore, suggests the need "of being very clear and precise
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about how a particular right is conceived: . . ."120 in
regards to health care, while there may be agreement that it 
is the right of all people to have equal access to health 
care, the right and what that equality entails must be 
precisely defined.
Take the example of freedom of speech; while someone may 
argue that such a claim right actually implies a right to be 
heard by the masses, such an argument is ludicrous. The same 
type argument holds true for health care. While the notion 
may be that whatever right exists in regards to health care is 
some how synonymous with a right to health, such a claim is 
equally absurd.
The design and function of the health care system will 
also be very different depending upon whether the right is 
considered a claim right or an automatic right. The current 
design of the health care system, in the United States, is 
based on the theory of a market driven claim right, i.e., the 
person must request the exercise of that right by setting an 
appointment with the physician or be admitted to the hospital 
by the physician. The patient must then make arrangements to 
pay for the services rendered, either by submitting proof of 
insurance, filing claim for services rendered, submitting 
proof of Medicare or Medicaid coverage, or making other
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arrangements to pay the bill.
There are those who, of course, cannot pay for medical 
service, these are accepted by the physician and hospital as 
a percentage of a write-off— especially if the hospital is a 
public hospital, though private and for profit hospitals also 
have a certain percentage of charity or "write-off" cases. 
Whereas, if it was an automatic right, the patient could 
exercise the right to health care coverage, regardless of 
insurance or ability to pay. This would be somewhat 
indicative of a socialized medical system; though this type of 
system has its own built in restraints on health care services 
received.
Another acid test for rights is whether the right is 
conditional or absolute. The conditional right, as the claim 
right, has certain conditions which must be met before the 
right can be exercised; this type of right usually contains 
certain limitations which may allow for the interference or 
voiding of the right. Obtaining and keeping a driver's 
license is an excellent example of this type of right.
The conditional right also tends to be very specific in 
its language, e.g., any person 16 years old or older who 
passes a written test and can prove the ability to drive an
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automobile by passing a driving test may receive a driver's 
license. The absolute right, on the other hand, usually 
contains some universal or general sense, with few limitations 
or exceptions, e.g.. Every person has a right to be treated 
with dignity and respect.
Further clarification of rights includes whether a right 
is positive or negative. A positive right, also referred to 
as an entitlement, is usually understood to mean a right to 
something, i.e., a right to receive something. Whereas, a 
negative right means a right from something, or protection 
from interference.
A prime example is found in the case of Roe V. Wade, 
which articulates a negative right in that it prohibits the 
state from interfering with a woman's right to have an 
abortion. Child abuse laws are another example of negative 
rights, i.e., they are meant to protect the child from 
exploitation or harm. Some examples of positive rights may be 
found in a child's right to an education or an individual's 
right to due process of law, i.e., the child is entitled to 
receive public education and the individual is entitled to a 
fair trial and legal representation whether he can pay for it
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or not. 124
Whether a right is considered positive or negative will 
also depend on one's social and political conception of 
justice. The libertarian view, for example, maintains that 
a just society will recognize and protect individual's moral 
rights to such things as life, liberty, and property, but 
their welfare is a matter of personal responsibility. These 
are conceived as negative rights, and any government 
intervention should be only to protect the individual's rights 
against interference, fraud, or c o e r c i o n .
A socialist conception of justice holds rights of 
equality to be primary and positive in nature; therefore, 
government and collective intervention ideally serves to 
ensure social equality. While the idea of what constitutes 
social equality may vary, the grounding principle stresses the 
obligation of government and society to promote the welfare of 
its citizens, ensuring that the most important needs are met, 
even to the point of limiting individual l i b e r t y .
In the liberal idea of justice, those individuals and
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institutions which are prosperous and have more than enough 
are morally bound to help those in need. Identifying with the 
socialist, "the liberal recognizes the extent to which 
economic coercion in an industrial society actually limits the 
exercise of negative rights by those lacking economic
power."127
Unlike the socialist, the liberal concedes the importance 
of enforcing some of the basic liberties associated with the 
idea of noninterference, e.g., freedom of speech, and is not 
opposed to all social and economic inequalities. In exchange, 
however, the liberal position does argue that the institutions 
which serve to protect these negative rights are also morally 
bound to support the positive rights which recognize and 
provide for the basic needs of the disadvantaged in society.’-2® 
So from the liberal conception of justice there may exist the 
recognition and securing of both positive and negative rights 
which serve to provide for the common good. At a level more 
germane to the topic, the physician/ patient relationship may 
vividly represent a combining of positive and negative rights. 
The patient may choose, by virtue of the right to autonomous 
decision making, not to allow a certain treatment or
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procedure, even if the choice may be life threatening, this 
would be to invoke negative right.
Concerning the expression of rights in relation to the 
medical patient, the "Patient's Bill of Rights," revised and 
adopted by the American Hospital Association in 1973, includes 
a statement supporting a positive right in that patients have 
a "right to essential health care." This document requires 
the physician, by claim of the individual's right to self- 
determination, to involve the patient, based on informed 
consent, into the decision-making process concerning treat­
ment, procedures, and the like. The physician's right, on the 
other hand, is positive in nature, having the ability to 
prescribe certain treatments and procedures by right of 
licensure and training, and having the duty to provide care 
and avoid harm,
Often incorporated into the rights language is the claim 
of what is considered to be "fair," at least from the 
individual's perspective. Fairness, however, is a totally 
subjective view, often equated with a desirable outcome, and 
has nothing to do with the aggregate perspective. In relation 
to health care, fair is often perceived in terms of what is 
subjectively desired out of an emotionally charged situation
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rather than what is actually and clinically needed. 
Realistically, fairness has nothing to do with the issue of 
rights, utilitarianism, health, or health care.
While a theoretical argument may be made for a right to 
health care, the reality is, a basic human or claim right to 
the delivery of even a decent minimum of health care does not 
exist. The reason being that a right to health care 
constitutes a claim against others for either goods or 
services, which in this case is the good and service received 
from the health care system.
Such a right requires others to actively participate in 
the provision of the good or service and depends primarily on 
the principle of beneficence rather than strictly the exercise 
of one's autonomy. Therefore, such a claim may conflict with 
the rights of others who wish not to participate in the 
provision and realization of such a health care system.
Establishing A Concept of Rights
Because of the potential for conflicts of interest and 
claims for competing rights, it is generally assumed that 
utilitarianism cannot support a concept of rights with moral 
force. Conflicting claims using the language of rights cannot 
be resolved in a rational way without some form of legal
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endorsement and corresponding institutional arrangement.^^® We 
may sanction a right to something with a moral position, but 
it is the granting of that right by some legal and/or 
institutional process which validates and gives substance to 
that right.
As Jeremy Bentham argued, a "Right . . .is the child of 
law: from real laws come real rights; but from imaginary laws, 
from laws of nature, . . .come imaginary rights. The
misconception of how rights come to be legitimate also seems 
to come from the failure to establish a clearly defined set of 
principles associated with an identified right relevant to a 
particular sphere, system or institution. Rather, claims of 
a right often come from the individual's desire or assumption 
of having a right to that particular thing, good, or service, 
or merely serve as an appeal to ideal values.
As stated in the "Introduction," one important element 
which is seemingly overlooked by many individuals, and in most 
theories addressing the issue of rights, is the participant's 
responsibility. The tendency is to discuss and define the
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concept of a right(s) without mention of the recipient's 
responsibility of reciprocity to the community which gives 
meaning and support to that particular, identified right. 
Given the complexities of the concepts of equality and rights, 
the idea of distributive justice, in this utilitarian scheme, 
is best defined from the framework of an identified sphere 
(for example, the sphere of health care, education, community 
services, and workplace).
Naturally, the development of such policies will not only 
have an affect on the individual, but the whole of society, as 
well. Therefore, clearly defined boundaries and consequences 
must be established within the particular system, institution 
or policy which recognizes and supports the identified 
right(s).
Another problem is deciding how much of a societies 
resources should go toward supporting the "right to" a 
particular good or service. In the context of this writing, 
the much larger question is: "How much of our available
resources should go for health care?" Additional dilemmas and 
decisions regarding resource allocation, benefit over burden, 
equality, justice, rationing, and on and on, serve only to 
complicate the issue. But, this does not negate the 
possibility of establishing a right to health care services 
from a utilitarian position.
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The Concept of Rights and Sphere-Specific Utilitarianism
One of the central arguments against utilitarianism being 
compatible with rights seems to revolve around the idea that 
while a rights-theory is person-relative, utilitarianism is 
p e r s o n - n e u t r a l . % do not agree with this argument, since 
the general principle of utilitarianism, concerning the 
individual, is that each person's happiness or good counts as 
only one unit. This is a much different premise than the 
charge of being totally person-neutral.
It is my intent to deal with this misconception and show 
that utilitarianism is not only compatible, but recognizes and 
supports rights of the individual, within the larger context 
of the society which makes use of the goods or services and 
within the identified sphere of utility. This perceived 
problem is further perpetuated by the "moral choice 
criterion"”  ^ of traditional utilitarianism which tries to 
dictate unreasonably rigid moral standards on every individual 
action. "^4 In a sphere-specific theory of utilitarianism, 
recognition is given to the idea that morality is fluid and
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the end or desired utility may be achieved by different means, 
actions, or choices.
Of course, such a proposal is not without its problems. 
In the particular utility sphere of health care, if the 
individual's right to health care is fully recognized, the 
distribution of services will vary according to needs, that 
is, the services required by one person might well be greater 
than that of others.
Simply stated, a problem of distributive justice has been 
raised. The question then is whether the utility of the 
individual should be included in the aggregate utility, which 
leads back to the problem of the individual's rights in the 
sphere-specific utility equation.
Another major conflict is between the notion of a right 
and the obligation of supporting that right. The claim of 
having a right is ineffectual by itself, but has validity only 
in relation to the corresponding obligation as recognized by 
others. For an obligation which goes unrecognized by others 
loses none of the full force of its existence, but a right 
unrecognized or unsupported has little v a l u e .
It makes no sense to say that rights exist without the 
concept of preceding obligations which validate the rights.
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for the actual relationship between the two is as between 
object and subject. Case in point, a man in isolation has 
only a duty or obligation towards himself. In community, 
however, the idea of duty towards self is superseded by a two 
fold concept of obligations and rights. That is, the 
individual has rights only when recognized as obligations by 
others, and in turn his participation in community calls for 
reciprocal recognition and support.
A person alone in the universe would have only 
obligations toward himself, for genuine rights exist only when 
recognized and supported by o t h e r s . it may be argued that 
the lone individual has rights or the right to do as he 
pleases, but such a premise seems merely a matter of semantics 
with no theoretical or applicable substance. Only in relation 
to others can there be a genuine claim or identification of 
rights.
It is also the case that the ethics of utilitarianism 
makes us all members of the same moral community, thereby 
creating the necessity of moral equality or humanitarian 
consideration. It is only out of a sense of community that 
rights get their force and meaning. In turn, the conferment
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of clearly defined rights provides the individual with the 
recognition of entitlement to participate in the c o m m u n i t y .
While it could be argued that rights exist whether fully 
endorsed or supported by all members of a particular group, 
the fact still remains that the existence of a genuine right 
is given meaning only by an acknowledged sense of obligation 
by others. Of course, an additional problem exists with the 
notion of obligation, for an obligation clearly undefined 
allows for arguments of how much or how often members of a 
particular community or society will be involved or support 
that identified right.
The view that rights and utility are incompatible seems 
to stem from the idea that rights are considered to have a 
higher value or priority than utility, except when the utility 
is extremely large, and only then is the utility given serious 
consideration. The problem with this position is that the 
threshold above which the utility becomes relevant is 
undefined and is predicated on the whimsical decisions of a 
few.
Another problem is that the guarantee of a right does not 
necessarily translate into an equal right, for such an 
equality is defined more by the arena or sphere to which it is
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related, than to the ideal concept. To unmask the ideal 
abstractions tends to point to the realities in which 
individuals live their lives. For example, the guaranteed 
right to vote may be equal for all who meet the stipulated 
criteria of age, etc., but such a right does not guarantee an 
equal distribution of power. Neither does the right to equal 
treatment before the law translate into legal equality.
While such concepts may be bolstered as the moral ideal, 
serving as rhetoric for equality, the existence of rights is 
in no way diminished for the individual by the utilitarian 
equation. The meshing of idealism with pragmatic reality does 
nothing to diminish the philosophical validity or stability of 
such a premise, even when the consideration of social and 
economic constraints are factored.
In this sphere-specific utilitarian theory, the morality 
of rights is predicated on the idea of equality, while the 
ethic of responsibility relies on the concept of justice, with 
consideration given to the differences of need. The reality 
is that the ethics of rights is a manifestation of equal 
respect, which attempts to balance the claims of others and 
self, creating an ethic of responsibility and reciprocity
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which rests on an awareness of and gives rise to an ethic of 
compassion and care.^ °^
Even in an ideal state which fully supports the concept 
of equal rights and justice, the need or desire to exercise a 
particular right, by an individual, is not going to be the 
same for all individuals at the same time. The fact that an 
identified right exists and is supported by a sense of 
obligation by the aggregate, even in theory, seems to warrant 
a valid case for the argument supporting the adjudication of 
utilitarianism and rights.
While there may be cases which seemingly compromise or 
negate a particular right, or theoretical scenarios which 
create exceptions to ideal principles of moral choice or 
behavior, the fact remains that the right still exists. The 
exercise of a particular right not only perpetuates the idea 
of aggregate obligation, but creates a sense of responsibility 
and accountability to those who give authenticity to that 
right.
Even in an ideal state of existence, the needs of one 
individual are not going to be the same as the need by others, 
if the concept of individual identity is to be maintained. 
The wants and desires of individuals vary, unless
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individuality is negated and all are programmed to desire the 
same things.
Arguments Favoring Rights and Sphere-Specific Utilitarianism
In spite of the apparent conflicts, four arguments may be 
made which support a theory of rights for the individual from 
a sphere-specific utilitarian position, and more specifically, 
a right to a decent minimum of health care. In such an 
attempt to adjudicate the issue of rights and utilitarianism, 
it must be remembered that ethical problems are not like those 
in science, that is, while scientific problems may have 
apparent solutions, ethical problems usually do not. 
Regardless of the inability to provide "solutions," or the so 
called last word on a particular ethical question, ethical 
issues may be adjudicated by a society's sense of community.
It is from this supposition that the first argument is 
based, that is, a sphere-specific utilitarian ethic makes us 
all members of the same moral community. The second argument 
is based on the notion of "collective social protection." The 
third argument contends for principles of "fair opportunity"^^^ 
balanced with obligation. The fourth argument analyzes the
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validity of rights and the concepts of utility based on legal 
and institutional support and the concept of distributive 
justice.
Beneficence, Morality and the Greater Good
While the fact that all members of a particular society 
are members of the same moral community may be an apparent 
tautology, the congruity of a particular society's morals are 
not always self-evident. Therefore, the fundamental support 
in a sphere-specific utilitarian moral commitment to others is 
based on the principles of beneficence, human sympathy and a 
general notion of goodwill.
In the sphere-specific theory of utility, the moral 
judgment of decisions and actions serve as a measure or 
representation of a society's interest based on a particular 
sphere. In this case, the sphere of health care distribution 
and the right of an individual's access, and the communities 
sense of obligation to provide such a good or service is the 
primary focus. Such a measure of utility serves as a measure 
or representation of human interest, and what it means for a 
person to have such a right.
First, it should be noted that utilitarianism in general, 
and sphere-specific utilitarianism in particular, "is not a
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metaethical theory about what it is for a person to have a 
right. . [but serves as] a normative theory about which 
rights people have."^* Such rights are those which have been 
clearly identified, defined, and incorporated into a society's 
general moral code, serving to benefit all it's members. In 
this case, the right to health care^ ®^ serves as the identified 
sphere of utility to be examined and adjudicated with the 
issue of rights.
Second, it must be acknowledged that many moral rules, 
principles, and virtues have exceptions. Even if a certain 
moral principle, rule or virtue is accepted in a society, 
there will be varying opinions and alternate methods of 
achieving the desired end or result. In other words, morality 
is often fluid and even adamantly held positions are found to 
contain exceptions.
For example, a moral position against murder has been
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historically an accepted principle. Yet, while considered 
usually wrong, it cannot be said that it is always wrong, for 
exceptions have been made through the centuries. While people 
may disagree about exactly what exceptions should be allowed, 
there must be a general agreement that exceptions do exist.
Most people would agree that it is permissible to kill in 
self-defense, if that is the only way to prevent someone from 
murdering you or your family. Others would concede that it is 
permissible to kill in time of war, provided that the war is 
"just," sanctioned by the government, and the rules of war are 
observed.
Some may think that capital punishment is permissible, as 
a way of dealing with vicious murderers. Others, hold that 
abortion is acceptable as an exception to the rule. 
Therefore, while murdering is usually considered morally 
wrong, it is not always considered wrong. And once this is 
admitted, it must be acknowledged, even theoretically, that 
exceptions do exist.
Given the fact that exceptions do exist in moral 
considerations, and according to the sphere-specific 
utilitarian theory, there may even exist conflicts between 
principles, rules, and virtues. In the case of decision­
making for moral actions, and under normal conditions, the 
utility rather than rule is considered the ultimate criterion. 
In the event of dubious cases, moral judgments would be
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considered on a case by case basis rather than being decided 
by a rigid application of established rules, principles, or 
virtues.
Still the task remains of determining if a sphere- 
specific theory of utilitarianism can serve as an adequate 
justification for such a claim right as access to health care. 
Based on the principle of beneficence, a fundamental basis of 
moral commitment exists to do good; in this case, to provide 
a good and do good by supporting the concept of a right to 
health care services.
Rights and the Collective Social Protection
The concept of "collective social protection" focuses on 
the correlation between legitimate health care needs and other 
needs that have conventionally been protected by various 
institution and governmentally supported agencies, such as, 
law enforcement, the fire department, public health 
departments, and environmental protection agencies.
It is out of a sense of communal well-being that such 
principles and services are founded and perpetuated. While 
such a concept cannot pretend to provide the last word on this 
or any other ethical or moral issue, it does derive its force 
from the shared sense of what is and is not rational, and a
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commitment to the welfare of a particular community by its 
members, even while "'muddling through/ t o g e t h e r . W h i l e  
the argument may be made that the provision for such services 
or public goods are not the obligation of the government or an 
institution, and that such responsibilities are nonessential 
and expendable, such a claim is not only morally unjustified 
but ludicrous as well.
Even a libertarian account of justice, which holds that 
such services "sacrifice basic liberties to the larger public 
interest,"^9 does not oppose other distribution modes of 
services if they are freely chosen. However, the decision to 
support such services are binding only to the extent that 
fraud or force of participation are prohibited. What is not 
clear, from this perspective, is if such a decision must be 
unanimous or merely agreed upon by the general consensus.
Another unanswered question is what becomes of such 
services and the distribution there of if one of the members 
becomes unable or unwilling to freely participate in 
supporting such assistance. Even in such an ideal state of 
individualism and "natural rights"^° any type of infringement.
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real or otherwise, would be considered grounds for appealing 
to some government agency, group, or legal institution, asking 
for correction or protection of the perceived rights 
violation.
Regardless of the theoretical position, the fact remains 
that . .we live in a world in which the powers of
government [and institutions] are routinely called upon to 
enforce (as well as d e f i n e ) t h o s e  rights and services 
deemed necessary for the welfare and greater good of society. 
While there may be disagreement in how these goods should be 
distributed and supported, even in theory, such needs do 
exist.
Even if one were to accept Robert Nozick's "entitlement 
theory" of justice in which government intervention is 
justified if (and only if) it protects the liberty and private 
property rights of individuals, it seems unclear how the 
general welfare of society is to be maintained. The position 
that those that have it (what ever "it" is, money, property, 
social position, etc.) should keep it and those that don't, 
suffer, seems morally unjust.
Even acts of charity, which may support the distribution 
of certain services and goods, serve as a potential means of
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discrimination, by providing limited or poorer quality goods 
and services. Such charitable actions may also be subject to 
the ebb and flow of cooperativeness of those contributing to 
the continuance of such provisions. To argue that property 
and the accumulation thereof serves as entitlement to certain 
services and goods available also diminishes the general well­
being and safety of society.
From the argument which advocates a right to health care, 
the libertarian position supports the idea of private health 
insurance which is voluntarily purchased, and promotes the 
idea that society is not morally obligated to provide funds 
which support public health care s e r v i c e s . W h i l e  such a 
theoretical position may bolster a claim of supporting 
individual rights, it is blind to the "coercive effect of
property on nonowners.
While it could be argued that utilitarianism does not 
fair much better in the recognition of rights, that is, some 
individual rights may be violated or subjugated by the general 
welfare commitment, the sphere-specific utility of health care 
takes such seeming violations or decisions into consideration. 
In this sphere of utility, the individual's right to health
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care is not denied but does contain certain limitations or 
qualifications, based upon the recipients responsiveness to 
health care services received. That is, other measures may be 
deemed more appropriate than the continued use of 
technological and prophylactic interventions found in a 
hospital.
For example, the person who is in a terminal condition 
may be offered the services of hospice, rather than the option 
of continued treatment which is deemed futile and only serves 
to prolong the agony and dying process. While this example 
may seem a justifiable or even radical exception, it serves to 
illustrate the premise that rights are not ignored in this 
sphere-specific utilitarian theory, but there are conditions 
of responsibility in laying claim to services and resources 
intended for the general welfare.
From the argument for "collective social protection, " any 
number of services or goods meant for the general well-being 
of a society will serve to support the sphere-specific claim 
of recognizing and supporting rights. Of course, none of the 
services will be immune to criticism or arguments which 
advocate a "better way" to utilize the resources. However, it 
still seems that a sphere-specific approach allows for a more 
equitable and just way of supporting rights and providing for 
the common good.
Take for example, the need for law enforcement; such
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services are provided by local, state, and federal agencies, 
funded by the general public through various taxes, grants, 
and donations. Each citizen has a right to expect, request 
and/or receive the services provided by such agencies, which 
serve to promote the common good of society. The fire 
department also serves as an example of an agency which 
promotes the general welfare of a community.
The right of the individual to receive such specific 
assistance, without regard to social status or income, is 
based on the idea of a recognized entitlement to live and 
participate within the community. Even the arena of health 
care provision, while multi-tiered in its funding methods, 
recognizes the need and right of individuals to receive needed 
services. This stems not only from a sense of beneficence, 
but from the premise of a recognized need for the betterment 
and safety of society.
While it may be argued that such access is not a genuine 
right, all hospitals have posted signs which state that each 
person has a right to receive medical services, regardless of 
ability to pay. While such agencies and services may be 
considered a given or necessity with exceptions, not subject 
to the same conditions relevant to the general claim of 
rights, they serve as definite and well defined support for 
such a premise, based on the notion of rights and the greatest 
good.
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Fair Opportunity and Individual Responsibility
From this position, rights and the notion of fair oppor­
tunity gauge the justice of social institutions by their 
tendency to counteract a lack of opportunity or misfortune of 
the individual who has no meaningful c o n t r o l . I n  as much as 
disease, injury, or some form of disability creates seriously 
significant disadvantages and diminishes a persons' capacity 
to function properly, justice is served if societal health 
care resources are used to restore an individual to some 
semblance of health, which in turn provides a fair chance for 
that person to use his/her abilities.
However, the obligations and sense of responsibility 
associated with utilization of the various public agencies and 
services, cited under the previous heading, are found in the 
pertinent conditions or rules of use. To abuse the rights by 
false claims or reports, and negligent or felonious actions, 
renders the individual liable with penalties of fines, 
prosecution by law, or other measures which punish such 
aberrant behavior. While a utilitarian theory cannot impose 
a moral obligation of goodwill and beneficence toward the 
community, it can take measures which address such antisocial
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conduct.
In terms of the concept of fairness, one of the main 
problems of classical utilitarianism is that it tries to 
dictate unreasonably rigid moral standards on each individual, 
which requires assessment of every action in terms of 
maximizing the social utility, regardless of the personal 
cost.^ '^^  In a sphere-specific form of utility, the individual 
is required to give moral consideration not to every action, 
but only the action(s) relevant to the maximization of that 
particular sphere of utility. For example, whether an 
individual decides to read a book for personal enjoyment or 
professional enhancement is not a consideration in the utility 
equation.
While the principle of fairness as justice, in this 
sphere-specific form of utility, requires the individual to 
give consideration to the aggregate welfare in relation to 
that particular sphere, it does not demand that every personal 
action be scrutinized so as to maximize the social utility. 
For example, in the sphere of health care, the individual 
would give consideration to the actual "need" versus "want" 
for treatment.
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The idea that all individuals seeking medical treatment 
are in need is unwarranted. The fact is, there are those who 
abuse the system with personal wants of attention, drugs, and 
simply from the conditioning of a society which advocates 
immediate gratification and a quick fix. The belief that 
medicine can alleviate all the aches and pains, colds and 
runny noses, stress and worries is ludicrous. Such 
expectations have led to a general abuse of the system, and a 
total disregard to the notion of individual responsibility and 
reciprocity to the general welfare.
Even if consideration is given by the individual to the 
aggregate welfare, an argument could be made that the concept 
of fairness is neglected when focusing on the distribution of 
benefits and burdens, apart from the general welfare. For 
example, rights of society's "sickest and most vulnerable"^^® 
may be compromised by the inability to maximize the social 
utility. While such discrimination may be a concern, the 
concept of fairness as justice does not negate the realities 
of life.
Equal considerations may be given to all, but the 
individual's response to the good or service received must 
also be a factor in the equation. A right to health care does 
not necessarily mean receiving any and all services available.
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regardless of the condition. Home care and palliative care 
may be considered just as much a right as entrance into a 
hospital. The fact that people are born unequal in many 
respects, such as, health, sex, color, intelligence and family 
situation, does not mean that equal consideration or treatment 
is neglected in the utilitarian equation.
The concept of a right is meaningless without a clear 
understanding of what that right entails and the
responsibility it holds. In a sphere-specific form of 
utilitarianism, the notion of fairness associated with a 
particular right is clearly identified and the responsi­
bilities associated with that right are well defined.
Legal and Institutional Support
In the history of health care development, the policies 
designed to address the needs of the general public has
seemingly contained more political rhetoric than careful 
analysis. It has also been the case that general distribution
of these goods has been left to the market place, with
policies and beneficent considerations to be tacked on after 
the market has established its hold.
In addition, though advances in technological and 
procedural capabilities have been greatly enhanced, the 
medical possibilities seem to have outstripped most logical
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and ethical considerations. Such a claim finds its support in 
the fact that many treatments and procedures are used well 
beyond any probability of benefit. That is, the burden far 
exceeds the potential for realized benefit by the recipient, 
and efficient use of health care resources.
While claims of beneficence may be made, the reality is 
that such endeavors are often more from a defensive posture, 
that is, fear of criticism and possible litigation by the 
patient's family, than any genuine potential for the patient's 
welfare. Other contributing factors in the equation include 
the psychological, emotional, and financial motivation for the 
physician, institution, nurses, etc., and similar consid­
erations by the patient and patient's family.
In such cases, the concept of a "right to" these goods 
and services have shifted from the individual's needs to the 
preferences, desires, or any number of other motivating 
factors, by the patient, family, and/or physician. In 
addition, decisions to continue treatments are often made in 
spite of the patient's wishes, further compromising the 
concept of rights, not only to receive treatment, but the 
right to self-determination. So, clearly, the issues go 
beyond those dealing primarily with conflicts between 
individuals, adding to the questions of rights growing out of 
friction between society's interests and the individual's 
welfare.
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While the clarification and endorsement of a particular 
right may come from recognition given by a particular group or 
society, such a right is given further elucidation and 
enforcement by laws and the institutions which support that 
right, in this case, a right to health care. The argument may 
be made that such action forces participation by those who may 
not wish to support such a right, thereby, violating that 
individual's right to freely participate (or not), or one's 
right to autonomous decision making.
One favorable argument for a "legal right to health care 
appeals to the role of governmental coordination in effecting 
charitable g o a l s . S u c h  action may be viewed as coercive, 
but the distribution of medical resources, or any other social 
goods or services may be justified if it is deemed that the 
recipients have moral rights to those goods or services.
Another consideration is the notion of individual 
responsibility and reciprocity in contributing to the general 
welfare of society. If the beneficent goals of a society are 
sufficiently and morally fundamental and important, even the 
libertarian and egalitarian arguments against coercive 
transfers of social resources are challenged.
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Even the argument from a notion of autonomy does not 
resolve the dispute, for being recognized as autonomous does 
not provide a necessary condition for exercising that right. 
Neither does a right to autonomous decision-making negate 
one's social or moral responsibility to the general welfare.
It is here that reinforcement by the powers of the legal 
and institutional systems serve to further establish and 
clarify the boundaries by which a particular right is 
identified. While such measures may seem intrusive and serve 
only to complicate the issue, it is still the case that such 
powers are routinely called upon to clarify and enforce rights 
or entitlements.^®^ Even if, ideally, something similar to the 
status quo could be maintained without such interventions, A 
could still ask B to justify his claim to certain entitlements 
that A also wants to r e c e i v e .
The legal and institutional support only serves to 
further ensure a clear understanding of a particular right and 
the benefits and burdens of responsibility associated with 
that right, in relation to the aggregate welfare. This does 
not mean that the individual is called upon to relinquish 
his/her personal needs of a particular good or service;
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rather, it does call for a distinction between need and 
desire. It must remembered that whatever right or entitlement 
is possessed "has not been gained independently of society but 
rather as a result of an interaction with society.
While there are many considerations left unexplored, the 
intent of this chapter has been to address some of the major 
issues associated with the question of rights and a 
utilitarian theory. Given the complex issues in the sphere of 
health care alone, it is acknowledged that the considerations 
and arguments given barely scratch the surface in relation to 
rights and distributive justice. However, such a statement 
does not negate the validity or viability of the arguments 
presented or the premise that rights and a sphere-specific 
form of utility are compatible.
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Chapter 6 
Rights, Utility and Distributive Justice In Health Care: 
Learning to Live With Limits
The four arguments presented in the preceding chapter 
argued for the adjudication of rights in a sphere-specific 
theory of utilitarianism. However, the questions related to 
justice and the distribution of health care resources were 
only minimally addressed. It will be the intent of this 
chapter to propose a system of distributive justice which 
serves in conjunction with rights and responsibilities in this 
sphere-specific form of utilitarianism.
To live within such a framework of health care 
distribution will afford everyone fair opportunity to receive 
the benefits of health care resources available. Of course, 
such a system also has accountability and responsibility in 
the exercise of the right to such goods and services.
While a right to health care depends "on the principle of 
beneficence rather than that of autonomy, and. . .may conflict 
with the decisions of individuals who may not wish to 
participate in. . .[this] particular system of health care,"^®^ 
to choose not to participate goes against all logical and 
rational arguments. Regardless of the type of health care 
system, all participate in some form or fashion, with some
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supporting the continuance of the system at a higher rate than 
others.
Take for example the current system in the United States, 
while the claim may be that choices are available for those 
who can afford it, they are still paying to support those who 
cannot. Whether it is through taxes, higher health care 
premiums, or inflated health care costs (as illustrated in 
Chapter 2), the choice of participation and cooperation, 
without paying for the health care of others, is an illusion.
Even the notion of autonomy has its limits within a given 
society, community or group which recognizes and support 
particular rights. And, while the principles of beneficence 
and autonomy "that lie at the foundations of justice [may] 
spawn conflicts within any portrayal of a just allocation of 
health care r e s o u r c e s , it is my contention that a sphere- 
specific form of utilitarianism is the most suitable theory to 
address such issues of distributive justice and rights, when 
combined with the notion of individual responsibility.
This is not to say that all questions and concerns can or 
will be resolved, but many of the problems of distributive 
justice may be addressed. Of course the question then, from 
a utilitarian theoretical position, is who decides how the 
system will work? That is, who is going to be the objective
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observer to make the decisions?
A Right to Health Care: Justice and Inequality
In moral and political theory, rights have traditionally 
been understood as entitlements a person may have to some 
service, good, or liberty.Faced with significant inequal­
ities in the distribution of health care services and 
resources, there is an inclination to assert that a violation 
of basic human rights is involved by such a denial or 
constraint. While any theory may present some possible 
options to the resolution of conflicts and rights, it is only 
in tangible contexts that the extent of the obligation 
associated with a particular right can be determined.
"Interests in justice as beneficence are sustained in 
part because of inequalities among persons. In the sphere
of health care these inequalities become even more pronounced 
by virtue of the natural and social lotteries. The natural 
lottery, or those events which occur outside of human 
responsibility, may bring good health to one person and poor 
health to another. Some individuals may be born healthy and
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remain so for most of their lives, and others may be born with 
genetic or congenital diseases which create life-long health 
problems. Then there are those who by virtue of an accident 
or serious illness become dependent on even more of the 
services and goods provided by a health care system.^®®
In the social lottery, some individuals have better 
fortune than others, that is, some have more advantages, more 
money, or more influence, and others are less fortunate, have 
less money, no influence, or become victim of the malevolent 
actions of others. Regardless of the circumstances, some will 
have greater need for health care services and resources, some 
will be able to afford more services, will have more choices 
regarding which doctor to see and which hospital to enter and 
others will not.
While the notion of specific rights and obligations of 
beneficence may presuppose a particular moral viewpoint, the 
idea of need does not necessarily create a right to particular 
services or goods. Only by the recognition and willingness of 
others to meet such a need, and the validation by 
institutional, governmental, and even legal support, can a 
right be considered legitimate.
Rights in this context, then, are contingent upon a 
balancing of individual need and social interests or the
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willingness to support such a c l a i m . I n  this attempt at 
social equilibrium/ claims of rights are prima facie rather 
than absolute, that is, while a particular right may be valid, 
it may also be overridden by more demanding claims.
For example, if a hospital is evaluating the need to 
implement a new program which would allow for cardiac bypasses 
to be performed or use the money for existing services, 
competing needs would be a factor in the utility equation. If 
such a service exits at a nearby hospital, or even in a 
neighboring city, duplication of services may not be 
warranted. The decision not to offer such a program does not 
negate the right of an individual to receive a needed heart 
bypass, it only creates a potential inconvenience of location.
Another consideration from a sphere-specific utilitarian 
position is the "problem of interpretation," which challenges 
the premise that the utility must be "'maximal' in every 
case,"^'^ or that equal access means equal distribution.
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Sheng, p. 38. While Sheng uses this phrase in terms of 
negative and positive duties (or rights), from a sphere- 
specific utility position, the notion is that while the 
maximal utility may not be achieved in every case, it can be 
realized through the maximizing of the identified sphere of 
utility. In this instance, the specific sphere is the 
provision of medical care and the utility to be realized is 
the greatest benefit in the overall distribution and use of
154
Seemingly unequal distribution does not mean a violation of or 
negate a clearly defined right; in this case, a right to 
health care services and resources. The right to receive 
health care will have value in varying degrees to different 
individuals, and the services and resources will be determined 
by need.
Concerning the potential claim that such a theory does 
not take seriously the utility maxim of "the greatest good for 
the greatest number," and compromises the notion of fairness 
and justice in distribution, health care needs cannot be 
satisfied in the same manner as other needs, such as those for 
food and shelter.
Regarding the utility maxim, there are certain conditions 
under which the "greatest good" is served. Immunizations for 
certain diseases certainly prove to be for the greater good, 
and the restoring of one's health may prove to be beneficial 
to the aggregate well-being. Another example may be the 
person who has need of a heart bypass; while costly, such a 
procedure will, ideally, allow the individual to return to a 
productive life, contributing to the general welfare and 
minimizing the need for continuous demands on health care 
resources.
In this context, such a proposal, based on the notion of
health care resources for the greatest number of individuals.
155
genuine need, while seemingly only serving to enhance 
distributive inequalities or injustices has actually created 
a more stable and equitable system. It must be remembered 
that not all inequalities are the same as inequities or that 
what seems unfortunate is always u n f a i r .
Just by virtue of the natural lottery alone, needs for 
health care services will vary from person to person. 
Individual circumstances will also be another determining 
factor. Much like a triage system found in an emergency room, 
there will be those individuals with major trauma who take 
priority over others with cuts, colds, and minor injuries.
Another relevant point is that just because a particular 
medicine, test, or procedure may be available, it is not 
always the case that such treatment is warranted. Kenneth 
Arrow, Ph.D., and Nobel Prize laureate, has rightly pointed 
out that while consumers may be better educated to the ways of 
medicine, they are not well qualified to decide which tests, 
medications, or procedures they genuinely need.
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utility. Futility, Rights and Health Care
While consideration of authentic medical need is of major 
importance, another equally important point is whether or not 
the treatment being received is or will be of benefit. Such 
an assessment may include the possibility of the care being a 
potential burden, that is, doing more harm than good or being 
of no significance. In such cases, while a life may be 
prolonged, so is the suffering, only serving to extend the 
dying process and expend medical resources.
Though it is essential to give consideration to the 
beneficial qualities of medical intervention, by determining 
the prognosis and value of the treatment available, it is also 
important to examine the appropriateness of excessive or 
futile treatment. If a morally realistic and just plan for 
health care allocation is to be maintained, it will only be 
with the contributions of physicians who can provide an 
understanding of the clinical significance and limitations of 
what is genuinely attainable.
In medical ethics, in general, and the sphere-specific 
utilitarian formula specifically, the secondary set of moral 
principles which ideally govern the behavior of physicians and 
support the utility construct are beneficence, nonmaleficence.
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distributive justice, and autonomy. While not immutable, 
these four ethical principles have evolved over time providing 
a moral framework for making medical/ethical decisions, 
including those involving life-prolonging therapies.
As a learned profession, physicians have a moral role in 
making clear the human condition, and the limitations of 
resources and technology available. It is through their 
contributions that a better understanding of the medical 
constraints and moral implications are possible, in the 
continuation or withdrawal of medical care.
In spite of the general public belief, there are 
particular circumstances that will make the use of medical 
resources a central issue in medical ethics. For example, the 
reality that we are subject to the constraints of finitude, 
i.e., human life does and will continue to have a limited 
duration. Another consideration is that resources for health 
care do have limitations. Treatment is often only partially 
successful, leaving some individuals with a quality of life 
they find unacceptable. And, while medical techonology will 
continue to produce new, promising, and expensive therapeutic 
interventions, medicine must acknowledge the conditions.
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limitations and finitude of the human condition.
In light of this human condition, the concept of futility 
will depend upon an acceptable definition and what we believe 
to be the appropriate goals of medicine. It must also be 
acknowledged that by offering life-sustaining treatment which 
is genuinely futile, the physician sends a mixed message to 
patients and families, implying a real choice when in fact 
none e x i s t s . I t  is also the case that "physicians who offer 
futile interventions under such circumstances are in fact 
deceiving their patients [and/or families] and compromising 
professional standards of medicine.^* Perhaps some case 
studies will illustrate the way this topic is raised.
Case One: Mrs. A Mrs. A is a 66-year-old woman with 
metastatic lung cancer. She has developed brain and bone 
metastasis and was hospitalized for increased shortness of
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breath and pain control. She is awake, oriented to time and 
place, and able to participate in treatment decisions. The 
primary physician and nurse have a conference with Mrs. A and 
her family to discuss her prognosis, the plans while she is 
hospitalized, and the possiblity of sending Mrs. A home with 
her family and beginning hospice care.
The physician explains that there is no further treatment 
available which will stop the progression of the cancer and 
the goal now is to keep Mrs. A comfortable. Mrs. A accepts 
the doctor's prognosis concerning her cancer and states she 
wishes to discuss the recommendation with her family. Her 
family, however, knowing that her disease is advanced, state 
they cannot imagine being without her. They know the end is 
near, but tell the doctor they want everything possible to be 
done, including attempts to resuscitate her should she go into 
cardiac or respiratory arrest.
Case Two: Mr. S Mr. S is a 56-year-old man with a 
history of insulin-dependent diabetes and coronary artery 
disease. He entered the hospital for a total knee replacement 
and initially did well after surgery, until suffering a 
respiratory arrest on the third postoperative day, possibly 
due to a pulmonary embolus (PE or blood clot to the lung). He 
was resuscitated but suffered anoxic brain damage and did not 
regain consciousness. He has been in the intensive care unit
160
for one week, but has not been weaned from the ventilator 
because of the anoxic damage to his brain stem.
In discussing his treatment plan with Mrs. S, the physi­
cian raises the subject of Do-Not-Resuscitate orders. He 
explains that Mr. S is not going to have any improvement in 
his neurologic status, that it is unlikely he can be weaned 
from the ventilator, and that he will continue to require 
total support, including artificial nutrition and hydration. 
The physician recommends that resuscitation not be done if he 
should arrest again, and offers the option of withdrawing 
other treatments.
His wife seems to understand the facts about her 
husband's condition, but insists that "he has always been a 
fighter" and would want everything that could maintain his 
life, even if it does not restore him to his previous level of 
functioning. She also acknowledges that she understands he 
will need to be transferred to a long-term care facility at 
some point.
Case Three; James James is a 12-year-old boy with 
leukemia who has been receiving treatments for his condition 
over the past two years. Initially, he seemed to be
181
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responding to the regimen, but over the past six months his 
admissions to the hospital have increased due to his 
immunosuppressed state. He has persistent pain, has developed 
pneumonia, and is showing signs of increased septicemia 
(systemic infection), along with the progression of the 
disease and the continuous failure to respond to treatments.
The only available treatment option is a bone marrow 
transplant, for which there is not a match within his family. 
While another donor match might be possible, the probability 
of finding a suitable donor is low. During the search for a 
donor, the increased wait decreases the likelihood of his 
survival while his condition continues to deteriorate and his 
pain level increases.
The physicians taking care of James all agree that 
palliative care is the only realistic and beneficent option 
left. In discussing this decision with the parents, they 
intimate that hospice care could be arranged and James could 
be kept comfortable at home while waiting for a possible donor 
match.
James' parents vehemently object to hospice care, feeling 
that such action only admits defeat and would lessen the 
continued search for a matching donor. They demand that he be 
kept in the hospital while waiting for the donor marrow.
Case Four: Brandy Brandy is a four-year-old girl who
162
was born HIV positive and has recently been diagnosed with 
AIDS. She has developed opportunistic infections, Kaposi's 
sarcoma and other symptoms related to her immunodificiency, 
along with pronounced wasting due to weight loss, diarrhea, 
and poor nutrient absorption. She is also showing signs of 
Pneumo-cystis carinii pneumonia (PCP)
While in the hospital. Brandy has been receiving 
symptomatic treatment for the pneumonia, AZT to interrupt the 
HIV cycle, alpha interferon for the Kaposi's sarcoma, and 
pentamidine for the PCP.^ ®^  IV fluids and nutritional suppli- 
ments are given to combat her poor physical status.
The physicians, nurses, and support staff taking care of 
Brandy meet with her mother to discuss discontinuing further 
treatment, keeping Brandy comfortable, and not resuscitating 
her should she arrest. Her mother objects to any decrease in 
the current level of care, stating that "a cure might be found 
in the near future."
Case Five: Mr. J. Mr. J. is a 44-year-old man who has 
wide-spread metastatic cancer from an unknown primary site. 
For unknown reasons, a noxious odor emanates from every 
orifice in his body. His pain is controlled and he remains
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alert and oriented. His doctor has explained that nothing 
further can be done to treat his cancer and suggests that 
palliative care be initiated.
Mr. J. asks that "everything" be done to keep him alive 
while he is still alert and oriented. He states that he knows 
he is going to die, and the odor coming from his body is 
sickening to everyone who enters his room, but his family and 
friends still come to visit him, so remaining alive has some 
meaning. He adds, however, that he wishes to be kept alive 
only as long as he is able to interact with his family and 
friends, and should he become comatose, he then wishes to be 
allowed to die.
In all five cases questions exist regarding futility and 
its normative implications, for example:
• Is it ethically permissible to offer care that does not 
benefit the patient?
• Are we ethically or morally obligated to continue the use 
of costly medical treatments and resources which do not 
benefit the patient?
• Must we continue treatments even if it means the 
possibility of increasing the patient's suffering?
• Must the physician(s) continue treatment(s) which he 
deems futile?
• Must treatment, which could benefit another patient, be 
given to a patient which is considered futile?
Of the five cases presented, it seems clear that the
first four constitute requests for the continuation of medical
care which is not medically indicated and futile. The fifth
case, however, provides an example of the precarious nature of
medical decision making. The patient has not requested that
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he be just "kept alive" or phsiologically viable at all costs. 
He has made it clear that should he become comatose, he should 
be allowed to die.
Historically, decisions not to offer or continue 
providing care considered futile "were made by physicians 
operating under the principles of nonmaleficence and 
beneficence."^4 These concepts allowed physicians to do what 
they considered to be in the patient's best interest, 
including not providing or continuing care which was 
considered futile.
However, with the heightened concern for patient 
autonomy, the increase in technology and potentially 
beneficial therapies, and even the physician's own fear of a 
malpractice suit for not "doing everything possible," 
intensive and often futile care is offered. Such actions 
serve not only to compromise the autonomy and moral conscience 
of many physicians, but promote the idea that any patient 
demands for treatment will be met.
To feel compelled to offer futile medicine not only 
exploits the ethics of many physicians but also enhances the
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public's fear of death and increases the inflated ideas about 
what medicine and science can achieve.^®® And, for those 
physicians who do offer futile interventions, for what ever 
reason or motivation, they "are in fact deceiving their 
patients and compromising professional standards of 
medicine.
Obviously, physicians and the health care system are not 
blameless in this shift of patient and surrogate expectations. 
Also, third party insurance has helped perpetuate consumer 
demands, and the fee-for-service reimbursement has encouraged 
physicians and hospitals to disregard costs and other social 
considerations. An additional concern, besides a family's 
request or demand for continued futile treatment, is the 
physician who, for what ever reasons, refuses to stop 
treatment(s) which is not medically indicated or beneficial.
Increasingly, medical decisions and treatment demands are 
made by patients and their families or surrogates under the 
principle of autonomy. However, respect for autonomy does not 
empower patients or surrogates to demand that physicians 
prescribe treatments which are considered futile and medically
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nonbeneficial or inappropriate.^®® Neither is the principle of 
patient autonomy an ethical absolute which functions as a 
trump card, serving to cancel "out other ethical values with 
which it may conflict."^® Like all moral principles, autonomy 
"has only prima facie standing and can be overridden by 
competing moral considerations."^®
Ultimately, the exercise of professional and 
institutional responsibility and ethical standards must 
address the requests and demands for inappropriate, marginally 
effective and futile t h e r a p i e s . T h e r e  must also be a 
statutory framework and institutional policies developed, 
supported by a social consensus and case law, which sanction 
only appropriate medical options, when attempts to arrest or 
minimize a disease process have failed.”^
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Such policies, developed within the framework of a 
sphere-specific utilitarianism, would establish and support 
the professional, institutional, and societal ethical 
standards. The criterion in determining the explicit values 
and probabilities in the use of expensive and scarce medical 
resources and technology would be instituted in light of the 
patient's diagnosis and prognosis, ability to respond to 
medical treatment, and the appropriateness of the medical 
treatment. Decisions to withdraw treatment would be made only 
after discussions with the patient and/or family, providing 
clear and precise reasons as to why no further life-prolonging 
care will be given.
It is also possible to create medical policies and 
procedures which address the "issues of use of high technology
policies which address the issue of futility, it may simply be 
more effective to use other more pragmatic measures to apply 
the standards related to futility rather than attempting a 
definition. For example, the Oregon plan, discussed in Chapter 
2, seeks to reflect community values by ranking various health 
care goals related to Medicaid (e.g., placing preventive care 
ahead of cosmetic surgery) . Or a society may simply choose to 
limit the use of therapies that may be of limited value and 
have a likelihood of minimal success in isolated cases if the 
expense limits the utility for the larger population. Since 
rationing policies make specific the values and probabilities 
that futility-based arguments leave implicit, it seems 
preferable to develop and adopt such policies rather than use 
subjective futility arguments as guidelines for limiting the 
availability and use of expensive and scarce resources.
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near the end of life."^” By developing professional practice 
guidelines for limiting, withholding, or withdrawing treat­
ment, including CPR (cardiopulmonary resuscitation), the 
physician is encouraged and supported in the decision to 
discontinue medical treatment deemed futile.
Such policies and guidelines could be developed by a 
public commission, augmented by lay members, which made 
recommendations, disseminated information and allocated 
priorities in the care of patients near the end of life. The 
legislative process would then transform these coalition 
sentiments into public policy.
However, in communicating the decision to stop treatment, 
the physician should not tell the patient or family that 
"There is nothing more we can do for you." "Instead, the 
physician should. . . underscore that everything possible will 
be done to keep the patient comfortable and to maintain the 
patient's dignity."^-® Such action not only respects the 
patient's right to be informed (when possible) but also will
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hopefully help patients and families begin to cope with the 
gravity of the situation and the inevitability of death.
While such attempts may be viewed as the usurping of 
individual rights and autonomous decision making, the utility 
of such decisions addresses the reality of the necessity to 
balance benefits and burdens. There is also a case to made 
for the ethical duty of the medical profession to omit futile 
therapies which are considered prima facie wrong. When there 
is no benefit to be realized, other than supporting a family's 
wishes, such actions compromise the intent of medicine and the 
welfare of society.
To attempt to deny that a situation exists, merely from 
the perspective of subjective and wishful thinking, does not 
negate the facts of a case. If anything, such a realistic 
approach acknowledges the authenticity of the situation, 
potentially supporting the individual's wishes and the well­
being of society.
Such a process gives voice to all parties concerned, that 
is, the patient, if possible, the physician and staff, and the 
family or surrogate who may speak on behalf of the patient. 
While the physician is under no obligation to prescribe 
treatment deemed futile, the physician is ethically bound to 
inform and educate the patient and/or family of the reasons 
for the decision.
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This determination not to continue ineffective or 
inappropriate treatment would also include the use of cardio­
pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and the writing of a Do-Not- 
Resuscitate (DNR) order by the physician. While CPR is viewed 
as an emergency procedure to be administered on patients who 
experience cardiac arrest, to perform such efforts in this 
context of futility would only serve to give mixed messages to 
the patient and family.
Furthermore, studies suggest that while the use of CPR 
may restore cardiopulmonary function, survival of the patient 
until discharge from the hospital is frequently less than 
favorable. "Of the patients who receive CPR, one third 
survive the resuscitation effort, and one third of these 
individuals, in turn, survive until discharge from the 
hospital •
In two independent studies, of the various 26,227 cases 
reported, an average of only 38.75% of the patients survived 
24 hours and only 15.8% of those patients survived until 
discharge.^®® Consideration must also be given to the
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patient's physical condition, any preexisting condition, the 
diagnosis and prognosis, and whether the patient was in the 
hospital at the time of the cardiac arrest.
While it would definitely be a violation of the mandated 
medical ethic of beneficence to discriminate against a patient 
on the basis of a condition or diagnosis, for example, HIV, 
AIDS, or old age, it is not a breach of the ethic to refuse to 
treat those who are "overmastered by their diseases, 
realizing that in such cases medicine is impotent. Again, in 
such cases, it is part of the physician's duty to educate the 
patient and/or family, providing a basic understanding of the 
particular disease and the potential for success or failure in 
treatment.
For example, "cancer" is generally understood by the 
public in a nearly singular conceptual framework, when in fact 
there are numerous "cancers", so different from each other 
that some are in fact curable, while others are not. In the 
case where multiple and varied treatments have not proven 
successful in arresting the specific disease process, 
continued treatment only gives mixed messages and false hope. 
In such cases, the principle of beneficence calls for an 
honest, albeit painful, decision to not continue providing
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medical care which is futile. It is then the responsibility 
of the physician to make appropriate recommendations and 
referrals for the patient to receive hospice or palliative 
care at home.
Such goals and resulting actions, supported by policies, 
affirm the ethical intent of medicine, the moral value of the 
individual, and the institutional integrity in discerning the 
limits of medical interventions. The social utility to be 
achieved by such a sphere-specific theory would, in turn, 
allow for a medical ethic which speaks out of beneficence, 
temperance, justice and human finitude.
Distributive Justice and Individual Responsibility
Clearly, the issues go beyond those dealing primarily 
with conflicts between individuals. At stake are concerns 
growing out of conflicts between society's interests and an 
individual's interests. While the futility argument addresses 
and supports a major point from a utilitarian perspective, 
there is still the questions of competing claims for general 
health care services and justice in distribution.
Perhaps the issue can be made clearer by the following 
poignant question: To the extent that our health care system 
can make it possible, does the child of a manual laborer, 
unemployed or uninsured person have the same chance of
173
avoiding a significant or life-threatening illness, and if 
contracted, surviving and fully recovering from it as the 
child of a well insured individual, physician or corporate 
executive?^*! Evidently, given the current state of affairs in 
the market driven, U.S. health care system, it can and does 
offer a higher probability for the physician's, executive's, 
or fully insured person's child to avoid such an illness, or, 
of surviving and fully recovering from a given illness, than 
it offers the child of a person who is uninsured or 
under insured.
In arguing for a proper distributive ethic of health 
care, it must be realized that the current U.S. system is a 
market-driven, multi-tiered system which rations according to 
income, ability to pay, and insurance coverage. And, while 
the patient may be a so-called consumer, medical care in the 
U.S. differs greatly from the usual commodity market purchase 
by customers
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the demand for medical care is generally unpredictable and 
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However, even with a universal health care system it 
would be impossible to afford such a system based strictly on 
the majority of patients' demands, physicians' personal 
agendas or the strongest perceived notion of rights. Such an 
interpretation of a utilitarian system would only perpetuate 
the irrational allocation of health care resources to the 
socially powerful, well-to-do, or the greatest number of 
healthy persons with the strongest preferences. For example, 
if just one person more than half the populace is 'healthy' 
then the greatest good is in fact determined by eliminating 
the benefit or "right to" such health care goods and services 
for all those who are in poor health or otherwise considered 
a drain on society.
It is here that the proposed sphere-specific utilitarian 
formula can accommodate an ethic of distributive justice which 
supports the notion of rights to health care. Rather than the 
notion of achieving the "greatest good" in general, the sphere 
of utility focuses on the maximum good to be achieved for 
those needing the services and goods in a particular sphere.
the cost of the care that will be needed usually cannot be 
predicted in advance. The need for the medical care often 
comes suddenly, minimizing the possibility of "shopping 
around." Another point is that the ethics of the medical 
profession makes medicine unlike any other business; there is 
no open price competition; physicians do not advertise; and, 
when a physician recommends treatment, ideally he is to be 
completely unaffected by considerations of personal gain.
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Consideration is also given to the notion that eventually all 
are, or will be, recipients of the needed goods and services.
In this case, the particular sphere is health care, and 
the theory calls for a realistic look at the diagnosis and 
prognosis of the patient, and the physician's assessment of 
the patient's ability to respond to treatment. Here, the 
notion of collective social protection serves as a driving 
force, calling for the preservation of resources for the 
future use of those in society whose need is also legitimate. 
Such a program would be a single-payer, triage based system, 
designed to meet the person's genuine health care needs, and 
treatment decisions would be "made despite society's diverse
moral values."-^
While a general consensus of moral values is not 
obtainable, a social process of priority setting would allow 
for the determination of what therapeutic and diagnostic
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interventions will be guaranteed to all as a part of the basic 
health care p a c k a g e . S u c h  decisions must also frame an 
ethic for medicine that takes human mortality seriously and 
that can guide us through the tensions that exist between ever 
new, promising and expensive medical interventions and the
reality of limited r e s o u r c e s .
In order to provide universal and equitable coverage, 
this health care system would be based on the following five 
elements of the Canadian health care system:
(1) accessibility, which prohibits any direct charges for 
insured services, and therefore does not allow for any co­
payments or déductibles.^®® For those services not considered 
insured, the individual would be financially responsible, with 
cost considerations based on preestablished co-payment fees. 
Such a condition supports the general utility condition of 
providing the greatest good for the greatest number, and, at 
the same time, recognizes the legitimate right of the
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individual to access the health care system.
(2) comprehensiveness provides coverage for all medically 
required physician and hospital services. This includes 
preventive care, physician office visits, and medications and 
diagnostic tests as an inpatient.
(3) universality grants coverage for all eligible 
residents, though emergency services are not denied to non­
residents .
(4) nonprofit administration reduces the overhead costs 
which add to the expense of health care without contributing 
to the resources available.
(5) portability of benefits allows for coverage anywhere 
within the United States, without the worry of filing an 
insurance claim or having additional out-of-pocket expenses 
for health care services and goods obtained away from a 
designated health care provider.
Such a plan of distributive justice would also make it 
illegal for an "insurance company to sell coverage for 
services provided by the national health plan."^^ However, 
supplemental insurance would be available, at a minimal rate.
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to help cover the cost of the services not provided or paid 
for by the universal plan. For those who choose or cannot 
afford the additional coverage, minimal cost-sharing 
provisions would be indicated for those services not 
universally insured.
In an effort to perpetuate the notion of distributive 
justice, within this sphere-specific utility formula, a system 
of revenue sharing between state and federal governments would 
be required. While not operated by the government, there 
would be federal funding and established guidelines to which 
each state must adhere in order to receive operating 
revenue.
There would also be the need to establish a series of 
local payment agencies that work within the established 
national g u i d e l i n e s . in turn, each payment agency would 
function like a large, prepaid, group practice, all providers 
would agree to accept assignment, and all residents would 
receive a medical plan number which guarantees the right to 
receive health care benefits.
While such access does not support or guarantee a right
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to any and all treatment deemed necessary by the individual, 
it does provide the right to reasonable and beneficent medical 
care. This sphere-specific form of utility takes seriously 
and provides a balance between rights and responsibilities for 
the individual and society. That is, to restrict or withdraw 
health care services does not sacrifice the rights of the 
individual for the greater good, but recognizes and 
acknowledges the limits of medicine, the scarcity of valuable 
medical resources, and human finitude.
As with any other major sphere under consideration or 
imposed upon the theory, the utility to be evaluated and 
achieved will depend upon the how the good, for that 
particular sphere, is defined and endorsed by the goals and 
policies established by a beneficent society. Accordingly, in 
order to support the rights of the individual, consideration 
is given to the individual's duty of responsibility to the 
well-being of society.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion: The Sphere-Specific Construct Revisited
It has been the attempt of this dissertation to 
adjudicate utilitarianism with the issue of rights. While the 
process may have seemed a bit unclear in the beginning, it was 
necessary to give an historical setting to the current 
realities in health care in order to better illustrate the 
theoretical and applicable possibilities of such a theory.
Admittedly, there are many questions and arguments left 
unaddressed, but it is my contention that the general premise 
that utilitarianism and rights are compatible has been 
illustrated. That is, the greatest good to be realized in the 
sphere of health care is to recognize and accommodate a right 
to equal access of medical care in conjunction with a scheme 
of distributive justice. The result being the mutual sharing 
of benefits over burdens, whereby scarce resources are 
optimized, futile treatment is minimized, and the greatest 
need is met. Such a theoretical proposal also enhances the 
idea of ensuring the rights of the individual, supports the 
idea of "fair opportunity" and provides for the "collective 
social protection.And, while the focus has been primarily 
on the sphere of health care, I still maintain that any major 
sphere of life can be plugged into the theory with equal
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results.
In the first chapter we examined some of the general 
contributing factors to the escalation in health care demands 
within the United States. It was noted that numerous 
philosophical arguments and intricate theories have been 
constructed in an attempt to resolve some of the substantive 
moral/ethical issues to which medical practice gives rise. In 
particular, two theorists' positions were generally alluded 
to, with the claim that these positions hardly meet the 
theoretical or practical challenge before them.
The supporting claims for this sphere-specific form of 
utilitarianism were presented as follows:
(1) Since health care is closely linked to economics, the 
rational and efficient use of resources is by necessity a 
primary component to be considered.
(2) Since the function of morality is to serve as a guide 
for ethical human conduct, and utilitarianism is a consequence 
based theory, the value or utility of the associated actions 
to health care are to achieve the greatest benefit for those 
needing such services. Such decision-making allows for prima 
facie obligations to become clearer and conflict resolution 
reduced.
(3) By virtue of the principle of reciprocity, the 
individual who expects and receives benefits from society
182
becomes obligated to promote or contribute to the society's 
well-being.
(4) Part of the intent of medicine is to do the most good 
with the health care resources available.
(5) While patient participation and self-determination in 
the care received are a valued part of medical intervention, 
such considerations do not validate the use of scarce 
resources when such actions are medically unwarranted and 
considered futile.
Though it may be theoretically desirable to ignore the 
economic factors associated with the sphere of medicine, such 
considerations are morally and ethically necessary. To aspire 
to provide access to the health care system for every 
individual and ensure quality medical treatment, regardless of 
ability to pay, is a pipe dream. And what is even less 
defensible is the illusion that health care within the United 
States is a guaranteed right, with minimal to no costs 
involved or personal responsibilities attached.
As argued, one particular advantage of utilitarianism 
over other theories is that the principle of utility serves as 
the grounding principle by which all other principles, morals, 
ethical positions, and virtuous actions are measured. In 
defining this sphere-specific utilitarian system and in an 
attempt to address some primary issues associated with health 
care, the major focus has been to adjudicate the internally
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coherent ethical theory of utilitarianism with the issue of 
rights.
The primary intent, therefore, has been to develop a 
theoretical and practical model which addresses and 
adjudicates a theory of "rights" within a sphere-specific 
utilitarian system. Ideally, any significant life sphere can 
be plugged into the construct and provide a means whereby 
specific rights are endorsed and the aggregate well-being is 
achieved.
The general assumption is that utilitarianism cannot 
support the general notion of rights with moral f o r c e . S u c h  
a supposition presupposes a "conflict of interest" and a 
"conflict of welfare" among the recipients because of the 
potential for perceived injustices and inequalities in 
benefits afforded to individuals by the system.
The claim is further made that utilitarianism is 
incompatible with rights, with the premise being that utility 
is person neutral. While utilitarianism may not be a 
respecter of persons, it does take rights seriously by virtue 
of not creating a hierarchy of individual respect. If rights 
are to be taken seriously, a right exists by virtue of a 
recognized need by the aggregate, and while all may not agree 
on the disbursement or enforcement of the right, the intent is
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that all have claim to that particular identified right.
In the various notions of utilitarianism, it seems that 
"states of mind" and "perceptions of happiness or pleasure" 
have predominated, rather than proposing the idea that the 
moral impetus of utilitarianism is to define the right as just 
actions and motivating people to achieve them.^®° The 
utilitarian dictates for right action, in the sphere of health 
care, are supported by the principle of beneficence and the 
need of the patient. As to whether the person has a "right" 
or entitlement to this service has been the question at hand.
My contention has been that the issue of "rights" must be 
defined in conjunction with the idea of a particular system 
with established and clearly interpreted rights, rather than 
from the individual's purely subjective desire or claim of an 
assumed right. It has been reiterated throughout that one 
important element which is overlooked in most theories 
addressing the issue of rights is the participant's 
responsibility; the tendency is to discuss rights without 
mention of the recipient's obligation in relation to that 
particular, identified right.
Given the complexities of the concepts of equality and 
rights, the notion of distributive justice must be analyzed 
only within a particular sphere (for example, the sphere of
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health care, education, community, or workplace). Naturally, 
the development of any supporting policy will not work 
strictly within the micro realm of the individual or the macro 
realm of society at large. Clearly defined boundaries and 
consequences must be established within the particular system 
or policy being examined.
It has been my assertion that only by utilitarian 
considerations, in health care or any other major sphere of 
life, can a clearly defined system of distributive justice be 
identified and a genuine right to a particular good or service 
be clarified at a more objective and equitable level.
It seems evident that the idea of "justice" and 
"fairness" in the sphere of our current system of health care 
is obscure, self-serving, and totally subjective for the 
individual and/or family. This is especially true given the 
fact that there is generally no accountability for demands 
made (i.e., "I want it because I think I need it," or "I want 
it because it is available"). And, in many cases, there is no 
sense of financial or personal responsibility for care 
received by the individual.
Neither does such a position give evidence of a 
perception of moral obligation to the well-being of society. 
Though the utilitarian construct may be seen as potentially 
coercive, the principle of utility can provide an educational 
foundation of moral duty and reciprocal obligation between the
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individual and aggregate claims for particular goods and 
services.
Another valid claim for the educational process is to 
provide a basic understanding of genuine medical success. For 
example, the diagnosis of "cancer" may be understood by the 
general public from a nearly singular conceptual framework, 
when in fact there are numerous types of cancer, so different 
from each other that some are in fact curable, while others 
are not. As noted in Chapter 6, while health care consumers 
may be better educated to the ways of medicine, they are not 
genuinely qualified to decide which treatments, tests, or 
procedures are most needed for specific diseases.
While it is true that education alone cannot establish 
the legitimacy of moral principles, such an endeavor can 
introduce the axioms and demonstrate their validity. And, 
while such education may not enforce a sense of duty, it does 
prescribe an awareness of the individual's responsibility to 
the needs and claims of others.
Such instructive endeavors may also be effective by 
virtue of the systems design. It seems, primarily, that 
individuals and society as a whole become accustomed to 
expecting what is available. If the sphere of health care is 
recreated with certain limitations, then the process of access
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is instructional in and of itself. Such a scheme further 
enhances the idea of ensuring the rights of the individual and 
the "collective social protection," described in Chapter 5.
While such a concept may be bolstered as the ideal, 
serving as rhetoric for equality, the existence of rights is 
not diminished by the sphere-specific utilitarian equation. 
The meshing of idealism with pragmatic reality does nothing to 
diminish the philosophical validity or stability of such a 
premise, even when factoring in the consideration of social 
and economic constraints. Furthermore, the utility or the 
good to be achieved is realized or produced by compliance with 
the secondary or supporting principles established by the 
particular sphere, in this case, beneficence, nonmaleficence, 
autonomy and justice.
While the overview of the historical development of 
medicine in the 20th century may not have seemed immediately 
clear, or relevant, as stated in the introduction, the purpose 
was to provide insight into the ethical concerns and 
inequities which exist within the sphere of health care. Any 
theoretical construct must be established within its 
historical setting, in order to give a clearer understanding 
of the goals to be achieved.
As with any major social sphere, escalation in demands 
for a particular good or service and the advancement in 
technology creates new problems and ethical concerns
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associated with equal access and distributive justice. 
Therefore, without a sense of the history associated with a 
particular sphere, the theoretical and practical implications 
and applications seem meaningless.
Along with a description of the current realities of 
health care, an examination of the positives and negatives of 
a liberal, sphere-specific, utilitarian system approach were 
given. To emphasize the dynamics of such a system, some 
specific case studies highlighted associated ethical concerns 
of futility and problems of distributive justice. As indi­
cated, the notion of individual responsibility is a key 
element in this sphere-specific utilitarian theory.
A construction of the sphere-specific utilitarian theory 
served as the primary focus for Chapter 4. While the general 
notion of the "greatest good for the greatest number" serves 
as the primary ethical construct for utilitarianism, such a 
supposition is too obscure when not defined from a particular 
or intentional point of utility reference to be achieved. It 
has been my assertion, therefore, that the "greatest good" or 
benefit must necessarily be defined from within a particular 
arena, or sphere, not from some nebulous concept or subjective 
position about life or feelings in general.
In support of this sphere-specific utilitarian construct, 
economic concerns and the appeal to man's common sense were 
cited as two primary and pragmatic reasons for the validity of
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this theoretical proposal. The idea that these two premises 
lend support to the adjudication of utilitarianism and rights, 
was also introduced.
While it is generally assumed that one of the primary 
problems with utilitarianism is that the individual is 
ignored, i.e., "the greatest benefit for the greatest number," 
I have argued that the individual agent should be included in 
the utility equation. As a member of the identified society, 
the individual is entitled to and automatically given equal 
consideration within a particular sphere.
It was also noted that while this sphere-specific theory 
contains a seemingly "situational ethics" approach, more akin 
to act utilitarianism, such action helps to identify and more 
clearly define the good or benefit to be achieved. This in 
turn sets the parameters which qualify and quantify the 
desired utility, clarify the established right, and determine 
the efficacy of decisions made and actions taken within the 
sphere under consideration.
In an attempt to address the adjudication of rights and 
utilitarianism, my assertion has been that the language of 
rights cannot be resolved in a rational way without some form 
of legal endorsement and corresponding institutional 
arrangement.”  ^ While we may sanction a right to something
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with a moral position, it is only by some legal and/or 
institutional process that substance is given to a particular 
right. Jeremy Bentham's claim that a genuine right is the 
child of law seems to hold true, for only from "real laws come 
real rights.
The misconception seems to be that rights come to be 
legitimate merely by an appeal to ideal values or the 
individual's desire or assumption of having a right to a 
particular thing, good, or service. Another problem is the 
failure to establish a clearly defined set of principles 
associated with an identified right, which is relevant only to 
a particular sphere, system or institution.
As reiterated throughout, one important point generally 
overlooked in most theories addressing the issue of rights, is 
the claimants' responsibility. The tendency is to discuss 
rights without mention of the recipient's reciprocal 
obligation to society in relation to that particular sphere 
and identified right. Given the complexities of the concepts 
of equality and rights, it seems apparent that the idea of 
distributive justice can be pursued only within an identified 
or specific sphere.
Furthermore, the claim of having a right is ineffectual 
in and of itself. Such a declaration only has validity in
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relation to the corresponding sense of obligation recognized 
by others. That is, an obligation which goes unrecognized by 
others looses none of the full force of its existence, but a 
right unrecognized or unsupported has little value.
It was further argued that the concept of a right is 
meaningless without a clear understanding of what an 
identified right entails and the responsibility it implies. 
In this sphere-specific form of utilitarianism, the notion of 
"fair opportunity," associated with a particular right, is 
clearly identified and the individual's responsibilities are 
clarified.
As stated, equal consideration may be given to all, but 
the individual's need to the good or service must also be a 
factor in the equation. Such consideration, in turn, calls 
for the person to give value to the notion of the "collective 
social protection."
It is also recognized that such an ethical construct 
makes us all members of the same moral community, with like 
considerations and responsibilities. In support of this idea 
of a moral commitment to others, this sphere-specific 
utilitarian theory further recognizes the supporting notions 
of human sympathy and goodwill.
To further reinforce the idea of a particular right, the
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powers of the legal and institutional systems may serve to 
establish and clarify the boundaries by which the right is 
supported. While such measures may seem intrusive and 
coercive, it is still the case that these entities are 
routinely called upon to clearly define and enforce rights or 
entitlements.
One of the great myths is that rights are acquired prior 
to, or independent of, social interaction. This tale is 
further perpetuated by the assertion that individuals have 
"rights" merely by the philosophical idea of a "state of 
nature.""G The truth is, however, that genuine rights exist 
"only after people confront the fact of scarcity and begin to 
argue the normative implications.
Such rights become further entrenched, within this 
sphere-specific form of utilitarianism, when the "normative 
implications" have been addressed and the pertinent system 
and/or legal support has been established. To some degree, 
such an examination of the normative implications results in 
actions which refute and cause a break with the myth or idea
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of a social c ontract . R a t h e r  than the individual laying 
claim to a right by virtue of some "privileged moment of 
promising,"^ *9 the particular right is realized by an ongoing 
social practice incorporated into the notion of social 
justice.
This does not mean that the individual does not give 
consideration to personal needs or desires, but that value is 
given, by the agent, to the notion that individuality is not 
realized apart from society "but rather as a result of an 
interaction with society. When taken seriously, such a
claim gives rational support to the sphere-specific notion of 
taking individual rights seriously, while maintaining the 
concept of achieving the greatest good associated with a 
particular sphere of utility.
Rights in this context, then, are contingent upon a 
balancing of individual need and social recognition of a 
particular r i g h t . I n  order to realize social equilibrium, 
claims of rights are prima facie rather than absolute, that 
is, while a particular right may be valid, it may also be
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overridden by more demanding claims of social need.
Another consideration from this sphere-specific utili­
tarian position is the "problem of interpretation," which 
challenges the notion that utility must be " 'maximal' in every 
case,"^ 2 or that equal access always means equal distribution. 
Unequal distribution does not mean a violation or negation of 
a clearly defined right; in this case, a right to health care 
services and resources. The right to receive such goods has 
value in varying degrees, based on individual need and ability 
to respond to resources used and care received.
As indicated, such value entails consideration of the 
notion of futility of treatment, which raised questions 
concerning the following normative implications:
• Is it ethically permissible to offer care that does not 
benefit the patient?
• Are we ethically or morally obligated to continue the use 
of costly medical treatments and resources which do not 
benefit the patient?
• Must we continue treatments even if it means the 
possibility of increasing the patient's suffering?
• Must the physician(s) continue treatment(s) which he 
deems futile?
• Must treatment, which could benefit another patient, be 
given to a patient which is considered futile?
While such questions deal with the utility considerations
associated with health care, any sphere under consideration
202
Sheng, 38. While Sheng uses this phrase in terms of 
negative and positive duties (or rights), from a sphere- 
specific utility position, the notion is that maximal utility 
will not be achieved in every case, but realized through the 
maximizing of the overall sphere of utility.
195
will have its own unique set of questions regarding need, 
distributive justice and benefit over burden. Whether it be 
public education, law enforcement, fire protection, or a clean 
environment, each individual has varying needs for such 
services, but it is society which benefits as a whole.
Ultimately, the exercise of professional and 
institutional responsibility and established ethical standards 
must address the requests and demands for any service or good 
connected with an identified r i g h t . T h e r e  must also be 
institutional policies and a statutory framework, supported by 
a social consensus, which sanctions the identified right(s) 
associated with a particular sphere o^ utility.
As stated earlier, clearly the issues surrounding rights 
go beyond those dealing primarily with conflicts between 
individuals. At stake are concerns growing out of claims 
between society interests and individual interests. While the 
futility argument, associated with the sphere of health care, 
may address and support a major utilitarian premise, there is 
still the question of competing claims for general health care 
services and justice in distribution.
In this context, the notion of a right is meaningless 
without a clear understanding of what that right entails and 
the responsibility it holds. In a sphere-specific form of
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utilitarianism, the notion of fairness associated with a 
particular right is clearly identified and the corresponding 
responsibilities are well defined. Such action only serves to 
provide additional support to the premise that rights are 
genuinely compatible within a utilitarian theory or system.
As indicated by the discussion and case studies 
concerning the issue of futility, primarily in Chapter 6, but 
mentioned throughout, there will be specific instances and 
necessary considerations which help clarify the boundaries or 
limitations associated with the distribution of particular 
goods and services. Even in the best of all possible worlds, 
unless everyone is identical, the needs of some are going to 
be different than the needs of others. Such variations of 
need do nothing to diminish the concept of a right, supported 
by a particular society, but do give rise to legitimate 
considerations concerning the individual and the reality of a 
particular situation.
The fact remains that the individual need not be 
sacrificed for the greater good. It is also true that 
morality is flexible, and virtuous principles, actions, and 
the utility, associated with a particular situation, good or 
service, can be realized in numerous ways and to varying 
degrees. Even in a pluralistic society, with diverse moral 
views, a sphere-specific utilitarian construct may serve to 
quantify and qualify the conditions associated with a
197
particular right. Such considerations and actions, in turn, 
contribute to the process of conflict resolution and decision­
making within that particular utility sphere, without 
jeopardizing or ignoring the rights of a few for the welfare 
of the many.
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